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THE GREAT COPPER CAPER: IS MARKET
MANIPULATION REALLY A PROBLEM IN THE
WAKE OF TIE SUMITOMO DEBACLE?
Benjamin E. Kozinn"
In the financial arena, the name of the game is money-make it
now, make it fast, make a lot. To some players in this financial
game, the question of whether to play fairly or unfairly, legally or
illegally, is not debated. Their only issue of concern is how much,
how fast, and what are the chances of being caught.'
INTRODUCTION

As the dust finally settled in the world copper markets in mid-1996,
the events behind one of the "most audacious" financial scandals of all
time began to emerge.2 The debacle resulted from the actions of
Yasuo Hamanaka ("Hamanaka"), formerly the head copper trader
for the Sumitomo Corporation ("Sumitomo"), a worldwide marketer
of copper metal.3 Hamanaka had engaged in approximately ten years
of unauthorized commodity futures trading, allegedly beginning in
1986.1 In his wake, Hamanaka left at least $2.6 billion in losses for
Sumitomo and a tangled web of litigation.6
* The author wishes to thank Stephen J. Obie, Trial Attorney, United States

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, for inspiring this Note as well as for his
friendship and guidance. The author would also like to thank Professor Jill Fisch and
Professor Steve Thel for their insight and expertise.
1. David M. Bovi, Rule 10b-5 Liability for Front-Running: Adding a New
Dimension to the "Money Game", 7 St. Thomas L. Rev. 103, 103 (1994).
2. See Paula Dwyer, Descent Into The Abyss: How the Copper-TradingAffair

Engulfed Sumitomo, Bus. Wk., July 1, 1996, at 28 ("The world has witnessed

numerous spectacular financial scandals, from the Ponzi schemes of the 1920s to the

rogue futures trades that capsized Barings PLC. But the Sumitomo Corp. coppertrading scandal is likely to go down in the history books as perhaps the most
audacious yet.").
3. Sumitomo Corporation, founded in 1919, is a Japanese company involved in a
variety of businesses, including the marketing of copper metal. See In re Sumitomo
Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 1 27,327, at 46,496
(CFTC May 11, 1998). Sumitomo, through its Copper Metals Section, or Copper
Team, bought and sold physical copper and used futures for "hedging" the risks of
their activity in physical copper. See id.; see also infra notes 65-69 (discussing
hedging).
4. A commodity futures contract is a standardized agreement between the buyer
(the long) and the seller (the short) to purchase or sell a specified quantity and quality
of a commodity, at a specified price, at some point in the future on an organized
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Although Hamanaka effectuated his scheme on the London Metal
Exchange ("LME"), his activity caused price fluctuations that
impacted the copper markets worldwide. As a result, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC" or "Commission") 7 conducted
an investigation in 1996 into the cause of the substantial price
movements. Ultimately, the CFTC and a group of private individuals
in the United States alleged that Sumitomo had "manipulated" the
price of copper futures in violation of Sections 6(c), s 6(d), 9 and

exchange. See 1 Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, Commodities
Regulation § 1.03, at 10 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Hazen, 2D]. Upon
expiration of the contract the parties may either deliver or accept delivery of the
physical commodity, or they may offset their position (i.e. either long or short) by
purchasing an identical contract opposite to their position and making a cash payment
in order to settle. See infra notes 61-634 and accompanying text.
5. See Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, Sumitomo Settling: Copper-Scandal Deal to
Include Fine, Barron's, May 11, 1998, at 10.
6. See, e.g., In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 46,501 (describing the settlement between the CFTC and Sumitomo);
In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 74 F. Supp. 2d 393, 394-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing
the settlement between Sumitomo and its co-defendants in the class action brought in
1996).
7. See infra note 34 (discussing the history of the CFTC).
8. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). In relevant part, §
6(c) states:
If the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission has reason to believe that
any person (other than a contract market) is manipulating or attempting to
manipulate... the market price of any commodity, in interstate commerce,
or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market.... or
otherwise is violating or has violated any of the provisions of this Act or of
the rules, regulations, or orders of the Commission hereunder, it may serve
upon such person a complaint stating its charges in that respect ....
Id.
The word "person" is defined in Commodity Exchange Act § la(16): "The term
'person' imports the plural or singular, and includes individuals, associations,
partnerships, corporations, or trusts." 7 U.S.C. § la(16) (1994).
9. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6(d), 7 U.S.C. § 13b. The statute proclaims:
If any person (other than a contract market) is manipulating the market
price of any commodity, in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market, or otherwise is violating.., any
of the provisions of this Act or of the rules, regulations, or orders of the
Commission thereunder, the Commission may, upon notice and hearing, and
subject to appeal as in other cases provided for in subsection (c), make and
enter an order directing that such person shall cease and desist therefrom
and, if such person thereafter and after the lapse of the period allowed for
appeal of such order or after the affirmance of such order, shall fail or refuse
to obey or comply with such order, such person shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than the
higher of $100,000 or triple the monetary gain to such person, or imprisoned
for not less than six months nor more than one year ....
Id.
It is worth noting that the Commodity Exchange Act not only proscribes
manipulation of a commodity for "future delivery" (i.e. a futures contract), but also
prohibits price manipulation of "any commodity, in interstate commerce" (i.e. the
cash markets for a commodity). Id. Cash markets are the markets where a buyer or
seller can purchase actual quantities of the physical commodity. See Johnson &
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9(a)(2) 10 of the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA" or the "Act")."
The CFTC obtained jurisdiction over Sumitomo pursuant to § 2 of the
CEA.U
On May 11, 1998, Sumitomo submitted an "Offer of
Settlement"' 3 of $150,000,000, which the CFIC ordered.'
Subsequently, on October 5, 1999, Sumitomo and others settled the
private class action suit brought against them for $134,600,000, making
the settlement the "largest class action recovery in the seventy-five
plus year history of the Commodity Exchange Act."' 5 The outcome of
all of the litigation provides one of the most interesting studies of
market manipulation in recent history, due to the fact that it raises so
many questions
regarding the understanding
of market
16
"manipulation.'

This Note examines commodity futures market manipulation in
light of Hamanaka's actions and the findings of manipulation by the
CFTC. Part I discusses the concept of market manipulation and
describes futures markets and the elements that currently define
manipulation. In addition, this part addresses the ambiguities that
surround the topic of manipulation by examining various academic
approaches to resolving them. Part II explains the complicated set of
events that comprise the Sumitomo scandal. Part III explores the
Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, § 1.09, at 39. In other words, purchasing in the physical
market would be, on a small scale, the equivalent of going to a farm and actually
purchasing a bundle of wheat.
10. See Commodity Exchange Act § 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 13. The Act reads:
It shall be a felony punishable by a fine of not more than S1,000,000 (or
$500,000 in the case of a person who is an individual) or imprisonment for
not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution, for.
(2i Any person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any
commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to
the rules of any contract market, or to comer or attempt to corner any such
commodity or knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission
through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless
or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly
inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that
affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate
commerce ....

ld. The concept of the "corner" articulated in § 9(a)(2) is discussed in detail infra
notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
11. See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 6(c), 6(d), 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13b, 15.
12. See Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A)(i), 7 U.S.C. § 2; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 30.9 (1999) (prohibiting fraudulent transactions by foreign entities).
13. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) 27,327, at 46,501 (CFTC May 11, 1998).
14. See id.
15. In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 189 F.R.D. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Sumitomo was required to pay $99,000,000 of the $134,600,000 total settlement. See
id.
16. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 28. The Sumitomo saga had yet to reach a close.
As of November 12, 1999, Global Minerals & Metals Corporation has not settled with
the Commission. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., No. 99-11, 1999 WL
1023586 (CFTC Nov. 12, 1999).
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current regulatory scheme under the CEA, proposes increased
monitoring of the hedging exemption under the Act, and discusses
efforts of international regulators to curtail harmful global
manipulative schemes. This Note adopts the view that, despite the
Sumitomo scandal, manipulation, in general, is not a rampant problem
in commodity futures trading. There is no need for further regulation
because the current regulations are stringent enough to combat
manipulation. Rather, this Note contends that utilizing the current
regulatory structure, in conjunction with increased monitoring of the
hedging exemption and enhanced international regulatory
cooperation, will more effectively quash the efforts of rogue traders
such as Hamanaka.
I. FUTURES MARKETS AND THE CONCEPT OF MARKET
MANIPULATION

Before addressing the intricacies of the Sumitomo manipulation, it
is necessary to examine the technical aspects of futures markets and
the role they play in the world's financial communities. Consequently,
this part provides a brief history of futures trading and its
terminology, the function of futures markets and the evolution of the
murky concept of market manipulation. Additionally, it explores the
academic debate regarding manipulation in order to illustrate the
complexity surrounding manipulation law and the difficulty in
establishing an effective solution to the manipulation conundrum.
A. History and Terminology of FuturesMarkets
In the early part of the nineteenth century, farmers in the United
States began using futures contracts to protect against detrimental
price fluctuations in agricultural commodities." Typically, the farmers
and merchants negotiated the futures contracts on an informal basis.' 8
Over time, however, organized exchanges evolved, presumably to
handle increased demand for these types of contracts. 19 The
exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of Trade, offered standardized
contracts on agricultural products that could be bought and sold in the
future, and thus eliminated the informal nature of the prior system of
futures trading.2" Although the new exchanges offered many benefits
to farmers and merchants, many people, particularly congressmen,
opposed the exchanges because they were too speculative in nature.2 '
In fact, in 1921, a United States senator commented that the Chicago
17. See Carolyn H. Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable
Advent of Consumer Derivatives,67 Fordham L. Rev. 3205, 3218 (1999).

18.
19.
20.
21.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Board of Trade had become such a "'gambling hell' that 'Monte Carlo
or the Casino at Havana are not to be compared to it.'"" The
perceived abuses on the exchanges, particularly speculation, which
was the suspected cause of the collapse of commodity prices during
the Great Depression, and off-exchange activity, such as the
development of bucket shops, led Congress to enact legislation to
regulate the exchanges.24
One of Congress' principal concerns regarding the commodities
markets was manipulation by traders.'
Section 3 of the current
version of the CEA, entitled "Necessity For Regulation,"' specifically
addresses these concerns by stating that:
[Tiransactions and prices of commodities on [ boards of trade are
susceptible to excessive speculation and can be manipulated,
controlled, cornered or squeezed, to the detriment of the producer or
the consumer and the persons handling commodities and the

products and byproducts thereof in interstate commerce, rendering
regulation imperative for the protection of such commerce and the
national public interest therein.2 7

As such, the CEA proscribes manipulative activity in §§ 6(c), 2" 6(d), z9
and 9(a)(2).30
22. Id.(quoting Christopher L Culp Competitive Enter. Inst., A Primer on
Derivatives: Their Mechanics, Uses, Risks, and Regulation, 3-30 (1995)); see also
Timothy J. Snider, 2 Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets §
12.01, at 12-3 (2d ed. 1995) ("[C]ommodity futures trading was regarded by many with
suspicion, particularly because the activity seemed to closely resemble another
activity which was at the time patently immoral-gambling.").
23. See Jackson, supra note 17, at 3218. Bucket shops ("shops") were a means of
scamming the general public. See id. The shops would claim to execute futures
transactions for the public. See id at 3218 n.130. They would take a customer's
money but never register the transaction with any exchange, essentially "bucketing"
the trades. Consequently, if the value of the contract decreased, the shop would
collect money from the customer. If the contract increased and the shop owed the
customer money, the shop would subsequently disappear, leaving the enraged
customer holding the bag. See id.
24. See id at 3218-19 (discussing the various pieces of congressional legislation
that preceded the Commodity Exchange Act that attempted to regulate exchanges).
25. See George A. Davidson, Squeezes and Comers: A Stnctural Approach, 40
Bus. Law. 1283, 1283 & n.1 (1985) (providing a brief history on commodity futures
legislation); Richard D. Friedman, Stalking The Squeeze: UnderstandingCommodities
Market Manipulation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 30, 31 & n.2 (1990) (same); see also Jerry W.
Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices- The Unprosecutable Crime, 8
Yale J. on Reg. 281,288-313 (1991) (providing a comprehensive history of commodity
manipulation dating back to the Civil War) [hereinafter Markham, Unprosecutable
Crime]; cf. Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security
Prices And The Text of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 359, 360 (stating that the prohibition of manipulation under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is to "ensur[e] that securities are in a certain sense
appropriately priced.") [hereinafter Thel, Regulation].
26. See Commodity Exchange Act § 3,7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
27. Id.(emphasis added).
28. See supra note 8.
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Problematically, however, the Act does not define the words

"manipulation,"

"corner," or "squeeze,"'" despite the fact that

Congress explicitly deemed such activity harmful. 32 Furthermore, the
legislative history fails to provide useful information for clarifying
'33
what Congress believed would constitute "manipulation.
Consequently, the task of interpreting manipulation has been left in
the hands of the courts, administrative agencies 34 such as the CFTC,
and academic commentators.35
Accordingly, any student of
commodity manipulation law will discover a body of law36that is "a
murky miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect.
Several reasons may explain why the state of commodity
manipulation law is in such tremendous disarray. One commentator
posited that "[t]his unfortunate state of affairs is principally the result
of the fact that the question of what constitutes market manipulation
29. See supra note 9.
30. See supra note 10.
31. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982)
[hereinafter In re Indiana Farm Bureau].
32. See 2 Philip McBride Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, Commodities
Regulation § 5.02, at 5-8 (3d ed. 2000)[hereinafter Johnson & Hazen, 3D]; Thomas A.
Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a Definition, 6
Hofstra L. Rev. 41, 41-42 (1977).
33. See Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at 311. The most
commonly cited piece of legislative history, in the context of market manipulation, is
the Congressional testimony of Arthur Marsh, president of the New York Cotton
Exchange, during the adoption of the Commodity Exchange Act. See Jerry W.
Markham, 13A Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims §
15.04, at 15-8 (1999) [hereinafter Markham, Commodities]. Mr. Marsh stated:
Manipulation is, "any and every operation or transaction or practice"...
calculated to produce a price distortion of any kind in any market either in
itself or in relation to other markets. If a firm is engaged in manipulation it
will be found using devices by which the prices of contracts for some one
month in some one market may be higher than they would be if only the
forces of supply and demand were operative... Any and every operation,
transaction [or] device, employed to produce these abnormalities of price
relationship in futures markets, is manipulation.
Id. at 15-8 through 15-9 (quoting Hearings on Cotton PricesBefore a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture & Forestry, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 201-02 (1928)).
34. Congress created the CFTC pursuant to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-64, 88 Stat. 1398 (1974). Prior to the CFTC's
creation, however, the Commodity Exchange Authority administered the Commodity
Exchange Act "under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture and a Commodity
Exchange Commission composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce
and the Attorney General." See Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at
313.
35. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 27,281 ("Neither manipulation nor attempted manipulation is defined
in the Commodity Exchange Act. That task has fallen to case-by-case judicial
development."); Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very)
CriticalAnalysis and a ProposedAlternative, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 945, 945 (1994)
[hereinafter Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis].
36. Snider, supra note 22, § 12.01, at 12-5.
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is in the first analysis an economic one, and accordingly, one with

which our legislative and, to some extent, our judicial machinery seem
particularly unqualified to grapple successfully."

In addition, the

CFTC has not established a workable definition of "artificial price,"'3
which constitutes the heart of any manipulation case.3 9 Finally,
neither the courts nor the Commission are presented with many
opportunities to decide manipulation cases.'

Thus, in an effort to

make sense of the confusion surrounding manipulation law, it is
necessary to examine briefly what purpose the futures markets serve,
how they operate, and how the concept of manipulation arises.
B. The FuturesMarkets: Function and Purpose
In the realm of commodities trading' there are primarily two
markets: cash or spot markets4 2 and futures markets. 3 The term
"futures contract" is not defined within the Act, but § 2(a)(1)(A)(i)
states that "[t]he [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission shall
37. Id. at 12-4 (emphasis added).
38. Infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
39. See Markham, UnprosecutableCrime, supra note 25, at 284.
40. See Snider,supra note 22, at 12-4, 12-5. The author argues that the reason for
the paucity of cases is three-fold: 1) manipulative activity is difficult to identify as
distinguished from ordinary market activity; 2) the severe sanctions imposed for a
finding of manipulation tend to encourage settlement; and 3) bringing a manipulation

case requires a tremendous amount of time, expense, and manpower and as such the

CFTC will not bring a complaint unless it is confident that it will succeed. See id.; see
also supra notes 8-9 (describing under which circumstances the CFTC may file a
complaint).
Another possible explanation for the lack of manipulation cases heard by the courts
and the Commission is the CFTC Division of Enforcement's unsuccessful track record
with regard to manipulation cases. See e.g., Suzanne McGee & Stephen E_ Frank,
Manipulation May Be Hard to Prove in Sumitomo Case, Wall St. J., July 15, 1996, at
C1 (noting that of the approximately twenty manipulation cases brought by the
CFrC's enforcement division, the only victories were those cases that settled without
admitting or denying the allegations) [hereinafter McGee & Frank, Hard to Prove].
Furthermore, even Judge Milton Pollack, presiding over the class action suit against
Sumitomo, noted that claims of manipulation "have been notoriously difficult to
prove." See In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 74 F. Supp. 2d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
see also Hieronymus, supra note 32, at 44 ("No manipulation case is ever simple. The
forces that determine price are numerous, complex, and always uncertain.").
41. The Act defines a commodity as virtually anything that is the subject of
futures trading. See Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 4. Currently, the
Act defines "commodity" in section la, which provides a laundry list of specified
items, in addition to "all other goods and articles, except onions as provided in Public
Law 85-839 (7 U.S.C. § 13-1), and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." See Commodity Exchange
Act § la, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Futures contracts on onions were excluded in 1958
because of the perceived adverse effect that futures trading had on the cash market
prices of onions. See H.R. Rep. No. 1036, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 8, 1957),
reprintedin 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4210-17.
42. See supra note 9 (describing the cash market for physical commodities). The
words "cash" and "spot" market will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
43. See Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, § 1.20, at 85.

250

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

have exclusive jurisdiction... [over] transactions involving contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market."" A commodity futures contract is a standardized
agreement to buy or sell a fixed quantity, quality, and grade of an
identified commodity at some specific time in the future. 5 A
commodity exchange46 is a marketplace where commodity futures are
traded. 7 Trading on exchanges" occurs in trading "pits" in an "open
outcry auction."49 Customers call their brokerage firm and submit an
order. 50 The order is then transmitted to the exchange floor by

telephone, and the floor broker bids (offers) the order to the other
brokers in the pit. 51 In an effort to limit negotiations in the pit only to
price, the exchanges are required to standardize all other terms of the
contracts.52

44. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A)(i), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
45. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit
"Manipulation" in Financial Markets, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 542 (1991). The
purchaser of a futures contract is called a "long" and the seller of the future is called a
"short". See Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35, at 948; supra note 4.
46. Section 5a of the Act outlines the requirements that a "contract market" must
satisfy in order to function lawfully as a commodity exchange. See Commodity
Exchange Act § 5a, 7 U.S.C. § 7a.
47. See Ralph T. Byrd, No Squeezing, No Cornering:Some Rules for Commodity
Exchanges, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 923, 924 (1979). One commentator creatively
characterized commodity futures markets as:
an elaborate game in which the participants agree to be bound by a set of
rules and to abide by the financial results of their actions within the selfcontained world governed by those rules. Much like the athletes in a
football game, commodity traders enter the trading arena in their colorful
uniforms, engage in certain actions which have known consequences under
the rules of the game and which are designed to carry out a particular
strategy. As the action progresses, the officials monitor all activities and
award gains or assess penalties as the rules prescribe. At the end of the
contest, the cumulative effect of the actions taken by all participants are
tallied up and the players are awarded a winning or losing position by the
officials.
Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with
Market Manipulation,8 Yale J. on Reg. 391, 394 (1991).
48. Section 5 of the CEA gives the CFTC the authority to designate an exchange a
"contract market" whereby legal futures trading may take place. See Commodity
Exchange Act § 5, 7 U.S.C. § 7. Generally, § 4(a) of the CEA makes it unlawful to
enter into contracts for future sale or delivery of a commodity not on a Commissiondesignated "contract market." See Commodity Exchange Act § 4(a), 7 U.S.C. § 6(a).
49. Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35, at 948. The noise level generated by
the open outcry system of trading overwhelms anyone who has witnessed the floor of
a commodity exchange.
50. See id. In addition to simply filling customer orders, some participants on the
floor of an exchange trade on their own behalf. See id.
51. See id. If a customer desires to sell a future, she completes the same steps as a
purchaser, except that she simply places an order of sale. For a more detailed
description of how trading is effectuated, see Edward T. McDermott, Defining
Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze", 74 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 202, 202 n.1 (1979).
52. See Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35, at 948; Johnson & Hazen, 2D,
supra note 4, § 1.03, at 11. The exchanges on which futures trade determine the
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In addition to providing standardized contracts, exchanges also
demand that market participants provide minimal financial
requirements known as "initial margin."'
Margin is a monetary
deposit that is sufficient to purchase the legal right to an entire
contract in the future.' In order to ensure that customers will satisfy

their financial obligations on a contract, the exchange's clearing
house55 values the contracts in every customer's account at the end of
each trading day. 6 Once the account value is determined, the clearing
house readjusts the cash balance in the margin account, a procedure

referred to as "marking to market."'
Depending upon which
direction the market moved in relation to a customer's position, a
customer is either credited with gains or she must provide further
margin known as variation margin.'
If, for example, a customer
entered into a long futures position for $100 (i.e. agreed to purchase a
futures contract) and subsequently, at the end of a trading day, the
price of the contract
dropped to $95, the customer would receive a
"margin call 5s9 (i.e. a request to increase the funds in the margin
account to bring the account back up to $100).1
Finally, once the parties enter into their respective positions, either
long or short, the parties satisfy their obligations by either accepting
or delivering" the actual commodity, or by liquidating their positions

month, quantity, and grade of the commodity to be delivered on each contract. See id.
For example, a copper contract for the month of May could set the quantity of copper
(e.g. at 10 tons), the quality or grade (e.g. 80% pure) and place of delivery (e.g. at
Long Beach, CA).
53. See George Crawford & Bidyut Sen, Derivatives for Decision Makers 12
(1996).
54. See id.
55. A clearing house is "[a]n adjunct to, or division of, a commodity exchange
through which transactions executed on the floor of the exchange are settled. [The
clearing house is] [a]Ilso charged with assuring the proper conduct of the exchange's
delivery procedures and the adequate financing of the trading." See Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Glossary, at 8 (CFTC P-105 (Revised 01-97)) (on file
with FordhamLaw Review) [hereinafter, Glossary].
56. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 53, at 12.

57. See id

5& See Glossary, supra note 55, at 41 (defining variation margin).
59. See id. at 26 (defining "margin call").
60. See Crawford & Sen, supra note 53, at 12-13.
61. If the short seeks to deliver the actual commodity, she files a -notice of
intention to deliver" with the sponsoring exchange (e.g. New York Mercantile
Exchange) or clearing house. See Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, §1.17, at 74-75.
The notice of intention is not directed at any one particular long. See id. at 75.
Rather, the exchange or clearing house assigns the actual commodity to an eligible
long (buyer), typically the long who has held his position for the most time. See id.
Delivery, however, does not result in "'a truckload of soybeans in your back yard.'"
kL Instead, the long is provided with a document which conveys title. See id. This
document is most frequently referred to as a "warehouse receipt." See id. For a more
detailed explanation of the delivery process, see id. § 1.17, at 73-83.
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in an offsetting62 transaction.63 This process permits 6the
futures
4
markets to perform several important economic functions.
The first function of the futures markets is that they permit
"hedging."6 As explained by one commentator, "[h]edging is a
practice by which a trader with a position in the cash market
purchases an offsetting futures position and thereby reduces the risks
associated with price variations." 66 For example, a corn producer may
fear that the price of her cash inventory will decline. If she sells the
corn now she could sell it for $1000 per ton. She will not harvest her
crop, however, for three months. In order to protect against a price
decline, she sells a three-month futures contract that expires during
harvest season for $1000. If at the end of the three-month period the
cash price of corn is $800 per ton, the corn producer will purchase an
offsetting futures contract for $800, closing out her hedge. The $200
62. To "offset" means to enter into an agreement directly opposite the one in
which the individual has an obligation. For example, if a short sold a September
copper contract, he can offset, or liquidate, by purchasing a September contract
identical to the September contract he previously sold. See id. § 1.04, at 12-14. In
other words, offsetting eliminates the requirement of physical acceptance or delivery,
and results in a net cash settlement (i.e. receipt or payment) depending on which
position (i.e. the long or the short) the market favored upon expiration of the
contract. In actuality, approximately 98% of physical futures contracts are settled
using the offsetting process rather than through actual delivery or acceptance. See
Crawford & Sen, supra note 53, at 11.
In addition to actual delivery or acceptance, some futures contracts are strictly
"cash settled." See Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis,supra note 35, at 948 n.6. An example of
a well-known cash settled contract is the Standard & Poors 500 Index contract traded
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. See id. Instead of delivering or accepting
delivery of the entire basket of stocks, the value of the bundle is determined on the
settlement date in order to establish the settlement price. See id. Who pays the cash
settlement and the amount of the settlement will depend upon in which direction the
market moved during the delivery period. See id. For example, someone who
purchased a September S&P 500 contract at $98, and sold the contract at $100, would
receive a $2 payment upon settlement.
63. See Byrd, supra note 47, at 924.
64. See id. at 925.
65. See Commodity Exchange Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (stating that futures
markets are "a means of hedging.").
The regulations accompanying the CEA in § 4a(a) state that contract markets must
submit to the CFTC "a bylaw, rule, regulation or resolution which shall limit the
maximum net long and net short position which any one person may hold or control
under contracts for future delivery of any commodity subject to the rules of such
contract market." 17 C.F.R. § 1.61(a)(1) (1999). This language is consistent with the
language of § 3 of the CEA which addresses the "Necessity For Regulation" of the
commodity markets. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66. Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the
Offense, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 345, 350 (1987). The use of the word offsetting in the
quoted definition is not intended to imply the same meaning as "offsetting" through
the purchase or sale of a futures contract in order to eliminate the delivery or
acceptance requirement. Rather, in the context of hedging, offsetting simply means
to take a position opposite the one that the hedger took in the cash market. So, if the
hedger seeks to sell her cash inventory, she will also sell a future in order to protect
against the possibility of a price decline in the cash market.
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loss on the physical sale of corn will be offset by her $200 gain on the
futures hedge. Because prices in the cash market supposedly parallel
one another,67 the purchase of the offsetting futures contract, and
subsequent profit on the futures transaction, protects against a decline
in the cash price of the producer's inventory.6' In other words, the

futures markets provide an insurance function for the hedger.'
The second7 purpose of futures markets is to provide a means of
"speculation."

In contrast to the hedger, the speculator" is willing to

assume either the long or short position depending upon in which
direction the speculator believes that prices will move.' Speculators,
although highly criticized73 and regulated,74 perform an important
function in that they "transfer risk from hedgers to speculators who
are willing to bear it and can presumably afford it."5 Although
Congress recognized the benefit speculators offer to the market, 76 it
also sought to limit detrimental speculation." Section 4a(a) of the
CEA,

entitled

"Excessive

Speculation-Limits

On

Trading,"

authorizes the Commission to set limits on both the positions (i.e. the
quantity of futures contracts a trader either purchases or sells) and the
daily volume of trading in a particular contract. 8 The excessive
67. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,298-99 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (Stone,
Comm'r, concurring); see also infra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining the
relationship between the cash market and futures market).
6& See Perdue, supra note 66, at 350 nn.43-44. The futures prices, however, can
diverge from the cash price, leaving the hedger with what is known as "basis" risk. See
Mark J. Powers & David Vogel, Inside The Financial Futures Markets 183 (2d ed.
1984). Basis is the difference between the price of the futures contract and the price
of the commodity in the cash market. See id.
69. See Joseph J. Bianco, The Mechanics of Futures Trading: Speculation and
Manipulation, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 27,32 (1977).
70. See Byrd, supra note 47, at 927.
71. A speculator is defined as "an individual who does not hedge, but who trades
with the objective of achieving profits through the successful anticipation of price
movements." See Glossary, supra note 55, at 37 (defining "speculator").
72. See Byrd, supra note 47, at 927.
73. See, e.g., Bianco, supra note 69, at 31 ("[Tlhe speculator is frequently viewed
as a sinister character."). Even in the early years of futures trading, speculation in
futures markets was viewed as a form of gambling which was not the intended
function of the exchanges. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
74. See infra Part III.A. (outlining the CEA's current regulatory structure).
75. Bianco, supra note 69, at 32; see also Johnson & Hazen 2D,supra note 4, §
1.14, at 59 ("The role of the speculator is both necessary and proper."); supra note 65
and accompanying text (discussing the statutory prohibitions on excessive
speculation).
76. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 305-07 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing
congressional recognition of the essential role of speculators).
77. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4a(a), 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1994).
78. See id.The Act states:
Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale of such
commodity for future delivery made on or subject to the rules of contract
markets causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes in the price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary burden
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speculation provision, however, only applies to the group classified as
"speculators." Hedgers, in contrast, are overtly exempted from the
position and trading limits under § 4a(c) of the Act. 9
Finally, the futures markets serve as a vehicle for price discovery.80
Unlike transactions in the cash market, futures transactions deal with
homogenous goods and highly standardized contracts.81 Cash
merchants buy and sell their inventories subject to prior and existing
business relationships as well as other non-price factors.'
For
instance, the price for a particular quantity or grade of a cash
commodity may be a result of the unique requirements of a particular
merchant.83 Moreover, cash market transactions, unlike futures
transactions, are not publicly reported.' 4 Additionally, there are
generally fewer cash transactions than there are futures transactions,
making the cash market a less competitive forumY As a result of
these combined factors, the futures markets "will frequently8 be
the
6
best available barometer of prices for a particular commodity. 1
Although futures markets provide tremendous financial benefits,
they also invite harmful activity, such as market manipulation, that
detracts from the markets' advantages. Consequently, Congress
mandated regulation because of individuals who engage in
unscrupulous behavior in an attempt to affect the price of a specific
futures contract. 87
C. The Concept of Market Manipulation
In an effort to protect the pricing function of the futures markets
and to deter individuals from attempting to affect prices, Congress
on interstate commerce in such commodity.

Id.
79. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4a(c), 7 U.S.C. § 6a(c).
80. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]

Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,298 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (Stone,
Comm'r, concurring) (stating that one major function of the futures markets is that
they are a price discovery mechanism).
81. See id.
82. See Johnson & Hazen, 3D, supra note 32, § 5.04, at 5-30.

83. See id.
84. See id.

85. See id.
86. Id. However, the proposition that the futures price, rather than the spot price,
is the best indicator of value only holds true until just prior to the delivery period. See

id. at 5-31. Unlike the spot market, the futures market reflects a more global demand
for a commodity. See id. Consequently, the cash price and futures price do not tend

to converge until just before the delivery period. See Bianco, supra note 69, at 29.
The convergence between cash and futures prices is the result of the shorts moving
the necessary supplies of a commodity into place in order to prepare for delivery. See
Johnson & Hazen, 3D, supra note 32, § 5.04, at 5-31. Thus, the costs to the shorts of
obtaining the deliverable supplies will generally be reflected in the price of futures.
See id.
87. See Commodity Exchange Act § 3,7 U.S.C. § 5.
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drafted a number of statutory provisions.ss Furthermore, pursuant to
the CEA, the CFTC and its predecessors established regulations to
further hinder devious behavior.'
One of the most important
regulations established to deter manipulation is § 1.38 which mandates
that "[a]U purchases and sales of any commodity for future
delivery... be executed openly and competitively."'
Additionally,
Parts 15-21 of the regulations accompanying the CEA, outline strict
reporting requirements for players in the futures markets. 91 Despite
the significant statutory and regulatory prohibitions, however, the
concept of "manipulation" continues to confuse and frustrate the
courts, regulatory agencies, and academics alike.'
The legal world has yet to agree upon a definition of manipulation.'
Numerous articles and treatises attempt to define it.' In contrast, an
unresolved academic debate questions whether manipulation is even
possible.' If one accepts the argument that manipulation is a reality,
then there are various types of activities that could be deemed
manipulative, thereby adding to the confusion.'
In an effort to
8& See supra notes 8, 9, 10, and 65 (detailing relevant CEA provisions).
Moreover, §§ 4b and 4c prohibit specific acts and trading practices including fraud,
bucketing, providing or causing to be provided false reports, wash sales, and crosstrades. See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 4b, 4c, 7 U.S.C. § 6b, 6c. Discussion of
these proscriptions is, however, outside the scope of this Note.
The CFTC is not the only entity authorized to institute an action under the CEA.
Section 22 provides for actions by private "person[sI." See CEA § 22, 7 U.S.C. §
25(a)(1); see also supra note 8 (defining the word "person" as used in the CEA). An
example of a private suit brought pursuant to the CEA is In re Sumitomo Copper
Litig., 189 F.R.D. 274,277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), in which a group of U.S. investors sued
Sumitomo and others for losses they sustained as a result of the Sumitomo
manipulation.
89. See Snider, supra note 22, § 12.05, at 12-10.
90. 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1999).
91. See i. Parts 15-21.
92. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 31-36 (outlining the problems with defining manipulation).
94. See Snider supra note 22, § 12.01, at 12-5; Friedman, supra note 25, at 31-35;
Hieronymus, supra note 32, at 41-47; Markham, UnprosecutableCrime, supra note 25,
at 282-85; McDermott, supra note 51, at 202-05.
95. Compare Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 547 (arguing that manipulation is
not really possible, but acknowledging that "[s]uccessful manipulations appear to be
more likely to occur in futures markets than in other securities markets."), with Steve
Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes- The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation,79 Cornell
L. Rev. 219, 219-24 (1994) (challenging Fischel and Ross' argument with regard to the
securities markets and contending that manipulation is a reality) [hereinafter Thel,
$850,000]; see also infra Part I.D. (discussing various academic approaches to
manipulation).
96. See Thel, $850,000, supra note 95, at 247-79 (describing the different forms of
activity that could be deemed manipulative). One form of activity that is
manipulative is the dissemination of false information, such as a false crop report. See
Snider, supra note 22, § 12.11, at 12-21. Dissemination of false information is one of
the few judicially agreed upon forms of manipulation. See Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971) ("[O]ne of the most common manipulative devices [is] the
floating of false rumors"); General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 224 (7th
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simplify the discussion of manipulation for the purposes of this Note,
however, the term manipulation will refer specifically to "market
power manipulation"' of futures contracts with underlying physical
commodities, because market power manipulation by long traders is
the most frequently charged form of manipulation under the CEA.9 s
1. What is Market Power?

Generally, "market power" is the exercise of "monopoly power,"99
a concept derived from antitrust laws."° In the realm of commodities
trading, market power manipulation arises when a long controls
enough of a particular futures contract, a substantial portion of the
underlying cash commodity, or both, during or near the end of the
delivery month.'' Because the long controls a significant portion of
the underlying commodity, she leaves no avenue for the shorts to
either offset their position or make delivery.'l 2 Inevitably, the shorts
are forced' to
deal solely with the long manipulator and must pay an
"artificial"' 3 price to fulfill their obligation, in order to avoid
defaulting on their contract and having to pay draconian sanctionsY 4
Obtaining market power over an equity security (e.g. IBM stock), in
contrast, does not provide the same benefits as obtaining monopolistic
power in a commodity (or commodity futures contract) 05 Therefore,
Cir. 1948) ("[Tlhe common criteria usual in manipulation.., cases are deceit [and]
trickery through the spreading of false rumors.").
97. See, e.g., Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Economics, Law, and Public Policy of
Market Power Manipulation 6-9 (1996) (providing a comprehensive examination of
and a proposed solution to the manipulation of commodity markets) [hereinafter
Pirrong, Market Power].
Another commentator referred to "market power manipulation" cases as "delivery
impairment cases." See Snider, supra note 22, § 12.11, at 12-20 (emphasis in original).
98. See Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at 380-89. Professor
Markham compiled an index of all of the manipulation cases brought under the CEA.
Out of the 44 cases listed, 37 (84%) were market power cases. See id.; see also Pirrong,
Market Power, supra note 97, at 6 & 16 n.18 (citing Markham for the list of
manipulation cases brought pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act).
99. See Pirrong, Market Power, supra note 97, at 18-19.
100. See Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, § 5.34, at 775.
101. See Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35, at 949.
102. See id. at 954; see also Johnson & Hazen, 3D, supra note 32, § 5.03[6], at 5-29
("[Tihe proper appraisal of manipulative ability is to view both cash and futures
activity in combination, rather than separately, since the ultimate issue is whether the
shorts have any recourse for fulfilling their obligations except through the suspected
manipulator.")
103. The concept of artificial price will be discussed infra notes 104-18 and
accompanying text. Artificial price could be viewed as a price that is not achieved by
"legitimate" forces of supply and demand. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop.
Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at
27,284 (CFFC Dec. 17, 1982). This definition, however, is vague and not very helpful
in clarifying the ambiguities surrounding manipulation.
104. See Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35, at 954.
105. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 543.
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the danger of manipulation in the commodity futures context is
greater. In securities markets, if a monopolist attempts to sell her
IBM stock at incrementally higher prices, investors will turn to
alternative investments that provide similar characteristics and
expected returns. 1 6 Commodity futures, on the other hand, are not
capable of the same substitution when the futures contracts expire.'
Those shorts that did not offset prior to expiration must either deliver
the physical stocks or pay a cash settlement. ' If a trader established
a large long position relative to the available supply held by others,
the short probably will have to pay an extravagant price to obtain

either the physical commodity or to purchase the offsetting futures
contracts held by the trader with the dominant long position."°
The exercise of market power by an individual or group is
characterized as a "corner" or "squeeze."110 Although the courts and
certain commentators have distinguished between these terms, they
are intended

to, and do, result in the same outcome-the

extrapolation of a high price from the shorts in order to settle their
contracts with the long.'
In order to profit from a manipulative
scheme, the manipulator must be able to achieve a greater profit on
settling his futures contracts than on the loss he will sustain while
"burying the corpse.""'

2. Defining Manipulation
Over the years, courts and various regulatory agencies have
attempted to establish a definition of a manipulation. For example,
there are six cases in which various courts of appeals considered the
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
109. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 543.
110. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: the
Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J. L. & Econ. 141, 144 (1995) [hereinafter Pirrong,
Self-Regulation]. Professor Pirrong provides a well-articulated explanation of how the
long trader is able to acquire a dominant position without the shorts being able to
identify the long or her positions. See id. at 145-46.
111. A "corner" and a "squeeze" are both subsets of manipulation. Traditionally, a
"squeeze" is thought to result from a controlling position in the futures market
accompanied by a natural shortage in the cash market. See Snider, supra note 22, §
12.10, at 12-18. The "corner," in comparison, is typically understood as a result of a
dominating cash market position and/or a controlling futures position. See id. The
goal of either an "intentional" corner or squeeze, however, is exactly the same. See id.
112. See Pirrong, Self-Regulation, supra note 110, at 144-45; see also Johnson &
Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, § 5.27, at 53 (describing the "burying the corpse" effect).
The "burying the corpse" or "burying-the-body" effect, as Pirrong deems it, is one of
the hallmarks of manipulation. See Pirrong, Self Regulation, supra note 110, at 144-45.
Essentially, once a long acquires a substantial portion of the cash market and
subsequently drives up futures prices, she must sell off the unneeded cash commodity.
See Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, at 53. The sale typically occurs at prices
below which she just paid for a long futures contract. See id.
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issue of price manipulation. 113 In Cargill,Inc. v. Hardin,"' the Eighth
Circuit stated that manipulation is the result of "conduct [which] has
been intentionally engaged that has resulted in a price which does not
reflect basic forces of supply and demand."" 5 Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit defined manipulation as "an intentional exaction of a
price determined by forces other than supply and demand,"" 6 or
alternatively, "the creation of an artificial price by planned action
whether by one man or a group of men."'" 7 Furthermore, in Volkart
Bros., Inc. v. Freeman"8 the Fifth Circuit examined the congressional
testimony of Arthur Marsh, president of the New York Cotton
Exchange during the adoption of the CEA, in its effort to craft a
definition of manipulation." 9
In In re Hohenberg Bros. Co.,120 the first manipulation case decided
by the CFTC,"' a full Commission defined manipulation as "conduct
intentionally engaged in resulting in an artificial price." 12 Later, in
Indiana Farm Bureau, the Commission pronounced its definitive view

113. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971) (examining
price manipulation); Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962)
(same); G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958) (same);
Great Western Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953) (same);
General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948) (same); Peto v. Howell,
101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938) (same). A comprehensive discussion of these cases, and
others, is available in Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at 313-23. In
addition, Markham, in the appendices accompanying his article, provides an allinclusive list of manipulation cases-the charge, the date of the decision, the result,
and the amount of time required to resolve the matter. See id. at 379.
114. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971).
115. Id. at 1163. The court further stated that, "[w]e think the test of manipulation
must largely be a practical one if the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act are to
be accomplished. The methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by
the ingenuity of man." Id. The problem with the Cargill court's definition of
manipulation is that it fails to identify what constitutes "basic forces of supply and
demand." Id. Thus, the court's attempted definition, like many others, fails to
provide useful guidance in the seemingly hopeless search for a workable definition of
manipulation.
116. Frey v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir.
1991).
117. General Foods Corp., 170 F.2d at 231. More recently, in Frey, the Seventh
Circuit opined that the "'know.it when you see it' test may appear most useful." 931
F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1991).
118. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
119. See Volkart Bros., 311 F.2d at 58; supra note 33.
120. In re Hohenberg Bros. Co. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,271, at 21,472 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977).
121. See Snider, supra note 22, § 12.09, at 12-15.
122. In re Hohenberg Bros., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 21,477 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971)).
Specifically, the Commission stated that:
A finding of manipulation in violation of the Act requires a finding that the
party engaged in conduct with the intention of affecting the market price of
a commodity (as determined by the forces of supply and demand) and as a
result of such conduct ... an artificial price was created.
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on market power manipulation and stated that the -[tihe acquisition
of market dominance is the hallmark of the long manipulative
squeeze." 1" The Commission declared, however, that the intentional
acquisition of a large futures and/or cash market position is not illegal
in and of itself.1 24 The CFTC claimed that establishing a dominant
position is illegal when the sole purpose of the position(s) is to extract
26
"artificial"'' prices from the shorts at the expiration of a contract.
The ultimate outcome of the decisions in Cargill, Volkart,
Hohenberg, and Indiana Farm Bureau is a four-part test most
commonly used by courts when deciding manipulation cases."2 The
Seventh Circuit, in Frey v. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission,' outlined the four elements necessary to prove
manipulation: 1) the ability to influence market prices; 2) the intent to
execute a squeeze [or corner]; 3) that artificialprice existed at the time
of the offense; and 4) that the accused caused the artificial price.'2
Initially, these elements appear straightforward. Substantiating these
factors, however, proves to be a vexing and complex task for plaintiffs
for several reasons.130

123. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 9121,796, at 27,285 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982).
124. See id. The Commission did recognize the potential for natural congestion
and explained that:
[W]here a long does not intentionally create the conditions for a squeeze,
and a congested futures market arises from other causes, often a "natural"
corner or low deliverable supply, manipulative intent may not be inferred
where a long does not exacerbate the congestion itself, but simply seeks the
best price from the existing situation.
Id This last sentence of the Commission's explanation attracted strong criticism from
Chairman Johnson in his concurring opinion. See id. at 27,292 (Johnson, Comm'r,
concurring) ("Recognizing the duty of shorts while avoiding undue exploitation of
their plight... should be the objective of the Act. The majority opinion does not
undertake to strike such a balance.").
125. See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text (discussing price "artificiality").
126. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L
Rep. (CCH) at 27,285. The Commission held that:
[W]here the intentional acquisition of market dominance is coupled with a
subsequent "squeeze" of shorts who are forced to deal with the accused, it
may be inferred that the charging of high prices was done with the purpose
of causing a price and reaping a profit beyond that which the legitimate
forces of supply and demand would otherwise have allowed.
Id
127. See infra note 129 and accompanying text; see also In re Cox, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 23,786, at 34,061 (CFTC July 15, 1987)
(outlining the four elements that the Division of Enforcement must prove in order to
establish a prima fade case of manipulation). The four elements have been modified
on occasion to fit the specific facts of a case. See In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F.
Supp. 1025,1045 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
128. 931 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1991).
129. See id. at 1175 (emphasis added).
130. See generally Markham, Unprosecutable Crime,supra note 25, at 283 (arguing
that "under present law the crime of manipulation is virtually unprosecutable.").
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a. The Element of Ability131
First, in order to show that a long manipulator had the "ability" to
influence price, the plaintiff generally must prove that the accused
1 32
controlled both the "certified cash market and the futures market.

In a market power manipulation case, the problem with establishing
the requisite control lies in defining the relevant cash market.'33 In
comparison, a controlling futures position is more readily identifiable
in an after-the-fact, or ex post, examination by simply reviewing
trading records to determine whether a trader actually possessed
control over the outstanding futures contracts. 34 Assessing the size of
the cash market, on the other hand, is more of a question of fact that
would be adjudicated by a court.
b. The Element of Artificial Price
The second and most troubling aspect in any manipulation case is
establishing the existence of an artificial price. 35 The lack of any
131. The element of "causation" is somewhat encompassed in the element of
"ability." Causation has been referred to as the "power to cause" (i.e. ability).
Pirrong, Market Power, supra note 97, at 160. If an accused can demonstrate,
however, that despite her ability to manipulate prices, the price aberrations were not
in fact caused by her actions, the accused cannot be found to have manipulated the
market. See Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, § 5.4, at 42.
132. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 1971) (concluding that
Cargill had "ability" to control price because it controlled almost all of the cash
market and 62% of the long futures).
133. Compare id. at 1165 (excluding out-of-town hard wheat stocks as part of the
available deliverable supply of No. 2 soft red wheat in determining whether Cargill
controlled the cash market), and Frey, 931 F.2d at 1177 (stating that "Volkart does not
preclude the possibility of successful manipulation without such control [of the cash
market]."), with Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962)
(declaring that uncertified cotton located at "ports designated as delivery points"
should be included in the available supply, and thus holding that Volkart did not have
the requisite ability to control price); see also Great Western Food Distrib., Inc. v.
Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1953) (proclaiming that the added costs of
bringing out-of-town eggs into the market created an "economic impediment" and
should therefore not be included in the available supply); In re Cox, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,786, at 34,063 (CFTC July 15, 1987)
(including out-of-town supplies of wheat in Kansas City as part of the "normal"
supply of wheat available in the Chicago market). The adjudicative bodies that
include out-of-town supplies generally believe that the short traders have an
affirmative duty to ensure that necessary supplies are in place during the delivery
period. See id. at 34,062. In contrast, those that do not include the out-of-town
supplies take the position that placing stocks into storage in anticipation of delivery is
economically wasteful when offset is the likely conclusion in the futures transaction.
See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,298 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (Stone, Comm'r,
concurring).
134. See infra note 320 and accompanying text (detailing reporting requirements
for contract markets).
135. See Markham, Unprosecutable Crime,supra note 25, at 284.

2000]COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET MANIPULATION 261
discernable benchmark from which to judge artificial price creates the
first real problem. 1" According to the Commission, a price is artificial
when it "does not reflect the market or economic forces of supply and
demand operating upon the price of the particular contract under
1
scrutiny. It is, in economic language, a nonequilibrium price."
Simply stated, when the aggregate forces that impact supply and
demand are all legitimate, price will not be artificial.'! Conversely,
when the forces acting on supply and demand are illegitimate, the
price is necessarily artificial. 139 Thus, the majority opinion concluded
that the focus of the analysis should not be on the ultimate price, but
rather on the forces that caused that price."
The Commission's discussion of artificial price, although ostensibly
comprehensive, leaves much to be desired.1 41 Questions regarding
what constitutes a "legitimate" force on supply and demand arise in
almost all cases. 42 Commissioner Stone, concurring in Indiana Farm
Bureau,1 43 sharply criticized the majority's equilibrium price
approach.' 4 The trouble with the definition, he maintained, is that
"all market prices are necessarily
equilibrium responses to the various
' 145
forces operating on them."
As a result of the complications surrounding artificial price analysis,
efforts to prove artificial price arise in a number of different forms."*
The most frequently litigated methods of showing artificial price
include: 1) comparing the price changes of the suspect contract during
136. See id
137. In re Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) at 27,288 n.2.
138. See id
139. See id.
140. See id
141. See eg., 2 Johnson & Hazen, 3D, supra note 32,§ 5.04[6]. at 5-35 (-[E]vidence
usually offered on the question [of artificiality] is the source of as many questions as
answers.").
142. See, eg., In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(rejecting the argument that the defendant's misconduct was "sufficient proof of price

artificiality.").

143. In re Indiana Farm Bureau, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) at 27,296.
144. See id at 27,300.
145. Id.In other words, when someone engages in "manipulative" conduct, it has
an effect on the market that results in a new market price. This new market price
becomes the new equilibrium price. As Stone declared, "[i]f all market forces which
contribute to shaping a price are defined to be part of legitimate supply and demand,
there obviously can be no such thing as an artificial price." Id.
146. See, eg., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1971)
(addressing the various approaches that the Government argued demonstrated the
existence of an artificial price); Great Western Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201
F.2d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1953) (discussing the three methods that the Government
sought to show an abnormal price in egg futures); In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,786, at 34,064-66 (CFTC July 15, 1987)
(analyzing "Historical Market Comparisons" and "Cash Market Price Comparisons"
in assessing whether price was artificial).
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the suspect period with price changes of the same type of contract

during the same historical period;14 7 2) evaluating price movement in

the spread,1" for example, between the May wheat future and the July
wheat future, in comparison to price changes in the previous years'
spreads; 149 3) analyzing the historical price relationship between
different Boards of Trades;150 and
4) comparing the futures price to
5
the cash price of the commodity.1 '
These four approaches, however, have also received criticism. 52 In
fact, the majority of the Commission in Indiana Farm Bureau
discredited the use of historical price comparisons in determining
price artificiality. 5 3 The issue of artificial price continues to perplex
the courts and the Commission, and as a result "there is no universally
accepted measure or test."'" In sum, the problem with artificial price
analysis lies in the fact that the concept of price "artificiality" is an
attempt to provide simplistic means of explaining complicated price
anomalies. For the most part, the term "artificial" generates more
questions than it does answers.
c. The Issue of Intent
Finally, the issue of intent presents another area of confusion in
manipulation cases. In one of the earliest manipulation cases, the
Seventh Circuit stated that "the intent of the parties during their
trading is a determinative element of a punishable comer.
Unintentional comers can develop, and should not carry the pain of
forfeiture of trading privileges.' ' 55 The question of the type of intent a
147. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1167. Put differently, one would compare the price
rise of a contract during the suspect period with price movements during the same
period in preceding years.
148. A spread is the price difference between one month's futures contract in a
particular commodity and a subsequent month's contract. For example, when
comparing November copper futures prices with those of December, the price
difference is the spread. See Glossary, supra note 55, at 38.
149. See Cargill,452 F.2d at 1167; In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 34,064.
150. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1167. For example, evaluating former price
differentials between a May wheat future in Chicago and a May wheat future in
Kansas City.
151. See id. at 1167-68.
152. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 66, at 367-70 (discussing the flaws surrounding a
historical price comparison).
153. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder)
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,796, at 27,286-87 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982)
("[H]istorical price comparisons ... are of limited probative value here because of the
unique combination of circumstances which led to the price rise in the corn pit.").
154. In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
155. Great Western Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir.
1953) (citations omitted); see also Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1162 (discussing the fact that
many squeezes do not involve intentional manipulation, but rather are the result of
"various natural market forces.").
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plaintiff must demonstrate, however, quickly became a problem.'5
For example, the accused could either have specifically intended to
create an artificial price (specific intent), or could merely have
engaged in conduct that produced an artificial price (general intent).
The confusion resulted from the Cargill court's discussion of intent,
when it explained that "[t]he aim must be [ ] to discover whether
conduct has been intentionally engaged in which has resulted in a
price which does not reflect the basic forces of supply and demand."'-,
The Commission in In re Hohenberg Bros. Co. added to the mess,
claiming that the accused must engage in conduct that intends to
affect the price of a commodity, and as a result of that conduct, an
artificial price is produced. 58
The CFTC finally resolved the confusion regarding its position on
intent in Indiana Farm Bureau, declaring that a plaintiff must prove
specific intent to create artificial price.15 9 The Commission stated that
"in order to prove the intent element" it must be demonstrated that
the accused acted "with the purpose or conscious object of causing or
effecting a price trend in the market that did not reflect the legitimate
forces of supply and demand.""
The Commission acknowledged,
however, that evidence of intent would mostly be circumstantial, and
that consequently "manipulative intent must normally be shown
inferentially from the conduct of the accused." " ' Moreover, "while
knowledge of relevant market conditions is probative of intent, it is
not necessary to prove that the accused knew to any particular degree
of certainty that his actions would create an artificial price." 16 Put
differently, a plaintiff must present evidence from which it is
reasonably likely that one can infer that the accused consciously
desired a particular result, regardless of her level of certainty about
that result.'6
Despite the courts' and the Commission's varied approaches to the
examination of the manipulation dilemma, "the courts and the CFTC
are still struggling to define the basic elements of the claim and to
differentiate between fair means and foul in futures trading.""
156. See 2 Johnson & Hazen, 3D, supra note 32, § 5.05[2], at 5-39 n.157.
157. Cargil,452 F.2d at 1163 (7th Cir. 1971).
158. In re Hohenberg Bros. Co. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.

(CCH)

20,271, at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977) ("A finding of manipulation in

violation of the Act requires a finding that the party engaged in conduct with the
intention of affecting the market price of a commodity (as determined by the forces of
supply and demand) and as a result of such conduct or course of action an artificial
price was created.").

159. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,283 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. See id.
164. In re Soy Bean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1995). This
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Although the concept of manipulation appears enigmatic and often
times unworkable, the case law does provide a starting point for
piecing together the manipulation puzzle. 165 Importantly, though, the
Division of Enforcement of the CFTC has never succeeded in
adjudicating a manipulation claim."
D. Academics Confront Manipulation
As a result of the ambiguity surrounding the issue of manipulation,
a number of legal scholars have attempted to reconcile the mess
created by the courts and the Commission by providing a variety of
proposed solutions. Their approaches range from eliminating
manipulation as a statutory prohibition to implementing further
regulation. It is important to consider their approaches in order to
comprehend the difficulties with establishing a workable solution to
the manipulation conundrum. Moreover, their solutions provide a
backdrop for demonstrating why, as argued in Part III, the current
regulatory scheme in conjunction with increased monitoring of the
hedging exemption and international regulatory cooperation, is
arguably an effective solution for dealing with market power
manipulation.
The question of whether or not manipulation is a reality that
167
mandates strict regulation has generated an academic debate.
Opposing viewpoints on whether a statutory prohibition against
16
manipulation is necessary came to a head in two law review articles.
Professor Steve Thel contends that the art of manipulation requires
regulation, and that manipulative schemes have several different
formulas.1 69 In contrast, Professors Daniel Fischel and David Ross
argue that manipulation is largely self-deterring, and thus does not
case involved a private class action suit, not an action by the Division of Enforcement.
165. See, e.g., id. at 1044 ("[T]here are some common elements that run through
manipulation cases.").
166. See, e.g., id. at 1043 ("[M]anipulation cases generally have not fared well with
either the CFTC or the courts."); see also McGee & Frank, Hard to Prove, supra note
40 ("In the 21 years of the agency's existence, it has yet to win a manipulation case
that has been contested in front of a judge or jury."); Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra
note 35, at 959 (stating that regulatory decisions regarding manipulation are "an
embarrassment-confusing, contradictory, complex, and unsophisticated.") (quoting
McDermott, supra note 51, at 205).
167. See, e.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting the debate between
Professor Thel and Professors Fischel and Ross).
168. See generally Thel, $850,000, supra note 95 (presenting an argument for why
manipulation should be prohibited by statute); Fischel & Ross, supra note 45 (arguing
that manipulation need not be prohibited). Although the debate between the
professors focused primarily on the securities markets, both discussions generally add
valuable insight to the concept of manipulating markets. Fischel and Ross' piece,
however, does address manipulation as it specifically pertains to futures markets. See
id. at 504-05, 547-52.
169. See Thel, $850,000, supra note 95, at 221-24.
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170
demand scrutinizing regulation.
Despite the fact that Thel's arguments focus on securities markets,
his arguments with regard to manipulation are applicable to almost
any organized trading forum. Thel highlights two major forms of
manipulation:
trade-based manipulation17 ' and contract-based
1
manipulation. 1 He acknowledges the fact that trade and contractbased manipulations are not the only two forms of manipulation.'7
His arguments demonstrate how manipulation actually functions in
securities markets, and they counter Fischel and Ross's contention
that manipulation does not require legal prohibition. 74 The crux of
his claim is that "[m]anipulators can sometimes control prices with
trad[ing], and by doing so they can reap profits, whether by taking
advantage of preexisting contracts or by inducing other market
participants to trade at manipulated prices. ' S Consequently, he
challenges Fischel and Ross and contends that based on his argument
that both contract and trade-based manipulation are problematic,
manipulation should continue to be proscribed by statute.
In contrast, the heart of Fischel and Ross's argument is that traders
76
will only try to manipulate prices if they believe that they can profit.
In order to profit, according to Fischel and Ross, manipulation
requires two key elements. 77 First, a trader "must cause the price of
the relevant security to rise; and second, the manipulator must be able
to sell at a price higher than the price at which the manipulator
purchased (plus transaction cost incurred)." 7 8 Unless a trader causes
the first element, there is no potential for profit because there are
transaction costs associated with trading. 7 9 Thus, traders will not
attempt to move prices because the risks accompanying a
manipulative scheme outweigh an unknown potential for profit.'8
Fischel and Ross specifically addressed the concept of manipulation
as it relates to futures markets, 8' stating that manipulation in futures
markets does not require regulation." First, price manipulation in
the futures markets demands huge amounts of capital.'
Fischel and

170. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 507 ("[VWe conclude that the concept of
manipulation should be abandoned altogether.").
171. See Thel, $850,000, supra note 95, at 227-47.
172. See id.
at 247-61.
173. See id.
174. See idt
175. let at 296-97.
176. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 511.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See i at 512.
l&
See L
See iet
at 512-19.
See idat 542-52.
See id.
at 548 (claiming that "legal prohibitions are unnecessary" in the futures

markets).
183. See ide
Notably, the Sumitomo scandal illustrated this fact. See infra note 270
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Ross contend that as a result of the tremendous financial
requirements, futures manipulation of financial futures contracts' 14 is
nearly impossible.'
With regard to physical commodities such as
copper, however, Fischel and Ross argue that although it is possible to
increase the price of the commodity by withholding supplies from the
market, this act does not necessarily ensure a profitable sale of a
contemporaneously acquired large futures position. 8 6 Accordingly,
they explain that one of the real problems in withholding a large
physical supply from the market is the "burying the corpse"'1 effect
that results after expiration of the futures contracts. 8
Upon
expiration, according to Fischel and Ross, an alleged manipulator may
not be able to sell his physicals position at a high price because less
expensive substitutes for the physical commodity may be available to
those requiring them.'89 As such, it can become very difficult for a
manipulator to profit unless the gains earned by offsetting their
futures positions with the shorts exceed the losses sustained while
burying the corpse.1"'
In addition to the problems associated with trying to profit from a
manipulation, Fischel and Ross assert that futures exchanges have
incentives to "adopt trading rules and contract terms that reduce the
costs associated with the exercise of monopoly power that may result
from corners and squeezes."' 191 As noted earlier, futures are traded on

organized exchanges. 192 Hence, in order to stay in business, these
exchanges must compete with one another as well as with other

(discussing the capital required to complete Hamanaka's plan).
184. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 45 (describing financial futures
contracts); see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 547 n.193 (discussing particular
futures markets, such as the Treasury bill market, that the authors believe are
extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to manipulate).
185. See supra note 184. It is important to mention that this Note does not take any
position with regard to cash settled contracts. See supra note 62 (discussing the S&P
500 stock index future).
186. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 547-48.
187. See supra note 112 (explaining the "burying the corpse" effect as it relates to a
long market power manipulation).
188. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 547.
189. See id. at 547-48.
190. See id. at 548. According to the professors:
[A]lthough a would-be manipulator in futures markets may be confident
that his position will cause prices to be higher at expiration than would
otherwise be the case (because of inelastic demand at expiration), he has no
assurance that the price at expiration will yield him a profit. An unexpected
increase in deliverable supplies or a reduction in demand could cause prices
to be lower than anticipated. Even if such conditions do not occur at
expiration, they may occur before the manipulator has been able to unwind
his position after expiration.
Id.
191. Id. at 548-49.
192. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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securities markets.193 Fischel and Ross argue that in order to maintain
competitiveness, the exchanges must adopt rules (e.g. position limits)
that will protect their members from harmful exercises of
monopolistic power."
At the same time, Fischel and Ross also recognize that a regulatory
system that completely proscribes large positions may be harmful to
the hedging and price discovery functions of the futures markets. 19
They observe that the exercise of market power is possibly a bad
enough act that it should be prohibited196 Nonetheless, they also
point out that market power can result from legitimate trading as well
as from trading that is merely designed to affect price.'9 As a result,
they propose that "optimal rules might not seek to prevent all
exercises of market power."'19 Ultimately, the crux of their argument
is that manipulation is really self-deterring and "because the
enforcement of prohibitions is likely to be costly, actual trades should
not be prohibited as manipulative regardless of the trader's intent." 1
Several commentators,' in addition to Thel, Fischel, and Ross,
have posited alternative strategies for confronting manipulation."1
The bulk of these other proposed solutions does not address whether
manipulation is really a problem, but rather, they attempt to deal with
manipulation ex post, by providing alternate definitions of, or
standards for, manipulation. In other words, the following group of
commentators challenges the current definition of manipulation and
attempts to craft alternative methods of how to deal with the problem
effectively.
One commentator, Professor Perdue, confronts manipulation from
an ex post viewpoint and argues that artificial price analysism for
determining a manipulated price "substitutes one unhelpful term for
Instead of applying the more financial-economic
another."' 3
approach to manipulation, Perdue establishes a "but-for" test to
determine whether conduct violates the manipulation provisions"0 of
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See Fischel & Ross, supra note 45, at 549.
See id
See id.
See id. at 544 n.182.
See id. at 546.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 553.

200. This Note will focus primarily on the commentators that addressed futures

market manipulation in the 1990's. In fact, a greater number of proposed solutions
were written in the 1970's. The more recent articles, however, are more applicable to

current market conditions.
201. See Friedman, supra note 25; Lower, supra note 47; Markham, Unprosecutable
Crime, supra note 25; Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35; Perdue, supra note 66.

202. See supra notes 135-51 and accompanying text (discussing artificial price and
the problems that accompany this method of assessing manipulated prices).
203. Perdue, supra note 66, at 348.

204. See supra notes 8-10 (citing the anti-manipulation provisions).
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the CEA.2 °5 Essentially, she engages in an objective inquiry: but-for
the price impact on the market the alleged manipulator would not
have behaved the way she did."06
Perdue's formula establishes a more simplified and seemingly
elegant approach to manipulation, and it effectively inquires into a
trader's intent: Was it manipulative, and therefore punishable, or was
it innocent, and therefore, by definition, not manipulative? Proving
intent in manipulation cases, however, is highly problematic.2 1, Due
to the fact that "proof of intent will most often be circumstantial in
nature, manipulative intent must normally be shown inferentially from
the conduct of the accused." '
Establishing inferential intent,
however, for large-scale players in the physical commodity markets, is
not always easy. If, for example, a trader establishes a large long
futures position as a hedge for a physical transaction, and
subsequently holds that position until expiration, he may not be guilty
of holding out for a price impact because he originally had a valid
hedge position. 0 9 Thus, this example provides at least one predictable
situation in which Perdue's approach would not provide an adequate
solution.
Moreover, Perdue's formulation of manipulation eliminates the
need to determine whether the suspect price is not the price that
would have been witnessed absent the activity of the accused. If a
plaintiff, however, is not required to demonstrate that a trader's
conduct had a negative price impact on the market, then any suspect
Congress prohibited
activity could be deemed manipulative.
manipulation to protect the pricing function of the futures markets,
and as such, creating an anti-manipulation scheme that does not
include price analysis would stray outside of the purpose of the
CEA. °

205. See Perdue, supra note 66, at 348. Perdue defines manipulation "as conduct
that would be uneconomical or irrational, absent an effect on market price." Id.
206. Perdue gives an objective phrasing of her proposed standard three times. See
Perdue, supra note 66, at 348, 393, & 401. However, she also provides two other
versions using subjective phrasing: "[M]anipulation occurs when the trader's
expectation of profit derives primarily from his expectation that his transactions will
affect the market," id. at 358, and "manipulation [is] any conduct where the
anticipated profitability of that conduct depends on its affecting the price of the
commodity traded." Id. at 395-96. Her last definition is quite ambiguous. She states
that a finding of manipulation should be based upon "conduct that appears
uneconomic absent a manipulative intent. Proof of such conduct should be sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of manipulation... [which would then shift] the
burden... to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonmanipulative reason for the
conduct." Id. at 400.
207. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
208. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,796, at 27,283 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982).
209. See Freidman, supra note 25, at 37-38.
210. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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In response to this flaw, another commentator, Professor Friedman,
modified Perdue's method.21" He proposed that a judicial body ask
two questions. First, the judicial body should query "what the long
[trader] would have done if he simply did not take the anticipated
impact into account," and second, "what the long would have done
had he put out of mind the additional pressure created by a system of
punitive sanctions for default. 21 3 Put differently, Professor Friedman
advocates that an adjudicative body should inquire whether a person
would have acted similarly "if some aspect of reality were altered or
disregarded." ' 214 Although his approach seeks to determine the root of
a market power manipulation charge, it also suffers from the same
intent-based flaws present in Professor Perdue's formulation.2
Unlike Perdue's approach, however, Professor Friedman does not
discount the use of price distortions.1 6 Nevertheless, his method still
remains weak because of the tremendous
confusion currently
2t
surrounding the concept of price artificiality. 1
Perhaps the approach offered by Professor Stephen Craig Pirrong is
best suited to tackle the manipulation dilemma. Although the
Commission in Indiana Farm Bureau rejected the use of historical
prices as a means of determining price artificiality,1 8 Professor
Pirrong clearly believes in the use of such information.2 1 9 He proposes
"utilizing historical data and universally accepted statistical
hypothesis-testing techniques."' Although his approach may be the
most accurate from an ex post standpoint, his proposal is unnecessary
because the current statutory and regulatory requirements prevent
market participants from effectuating unfavorable manipulative
schemes. 2
Finally, Professor Jerry Markham described manipulation as the
"unprosecutable crime. ' ' m In accordance with his position that
prosecuting manipulation cases is virtually impossible, m he argues
both for amending manipulation law, in order to clarify the
211. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 38.
212 See id. at 58-59.

213. Id. at 59. The second question with regard to Professor Friedman's proposal
focuses on the draconian sanctions that shorts must pay if they default on a contract.
See supra text accompanying note 104.
214. Freidman, supra note 25, at 59.

215. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
216. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 54-57.
217. See supra notes 135-54 and accompanying text; see also Pirrong, Critical
Analysis, supra note 25, at 991 (claiming that because the use of historical prices was
discredited by the CFTC in IndianaFarm Bureau, Professor Freidman's formula will
not work without "rehabilitation of the price artificiality doctrine").
218. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
219. See Pirrong, CriticalAnalysis, supra note 35, at 995.
220. Id.
221. See infra Part lII.B.1.
222. Markham, UnprosecutableCrime,supra note 25, at 281.

223. See id. at 357.
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ambiguities, and for a more affirmative regulatory role for the CFTC.
He contends that the four-part test z 4 that the Commission is required
to prove is a "daunting, indeed impossible, task for the CFTC staff."
Professor Markham criticized commentators who attempt to solve the
manipulation puzzle by simply searching for a more workable
definition. 6 His solution calls for more affirmative measures by the
CFrC.17 He proposes increased daily surveillance by the CFTC over
the life of a contract, and furthermore, he desires more careful
oversight of the cash markets as well.u29

II. THE SUMITOMO SCANDAL

Even in the midst of the confusion surrounding the concept of
manipulation, the Commission in In re Sumitomo Corp.,"0 articulated
the aforementioned23' four-part analysis and determined that
Sumitomo successfully completed a long market power manipulation
in violation of the CEA.P2 Part II of this Note seeks to decipher the
events of Sumitomo's manipulation, one of the most elaborate
manipulation schemes in the history of commodities trading. This
part will examine the Sumitomo scandal as an example of market
power manipulation, particularly in the context of whether
manipulation is truly a problem. Although Hamanaka's actions
adversely affected the market, the outlandish nature of the case made
it an anomaly rather than evidence of an unchecked problem.
In June 1996, the headline to an article in the Wall Street Journal
Europe edition announced, "Copper Prices Plummet in London on
Tremors from Sumitomo Fiasco. ' 'u3 Finally, the world began to
witness the fallout of Yasuo Hamanaka's decade-long scheme to
224. See supra text accompanying note 129.
225. Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at 357.
226. See id. at 358-61.

227. See id. at 363 ("[T]he CFTC must play a much more affirmative role in the
market place. It must simplify prosecutions, and its goal must be to assure a 'fair and
orderly' market.").
228. See id. at 365.
229. See id. at 365-66.
230. The full title of the order reads, "Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to
Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act and Findings and Order

Imposing Remedial Sanctions." See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
27,327, at 46,496 (CFTC May 11, 1998)
[hereinafter Order Imposing Remedial Sanctions]. Importantly, none of the factual
findings in the CFTC's order were adjudicated. Sumitomo stipulated to all alleged
facts in the order pursuant to its settlement. See id. The same problem holds true for
the many factual findings in the Merrill Lynch settlement. See In re Global Minerals
& Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 27,686, at
48,248 (CFTC May 20, 1999).

231. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

232- See supra notes 8-10.
233. Copper Prices Plummet in London on Tremors from Sumitomo Fiasco, Wall
St. J. Eur., June 25, 1996, at 21.
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control the price of copper.-' Hamanaka, one of the most feared
traders in the world's copper market,' 5 was appointed as the head
copper trader for Sumitomo Corporation around 1986.1 Prior to
1986, however, Mr. Hamanaka purchased and sold physical copper as
a trader for the Non-Ferrous Metals Department of Sumitomo. Z-7 In
the period immediately preceding and subsequent to Hamanaka's
appointment as head copper trader, from approximately 1986 to 1989,
the Sumitomo Copper Team - suffered tremendous losses. 9 The
dramatic losses largely resulted from purchases and sales of actual
copper, made by Hamanaka, in conjunction with speculative futures
trading, which was an attempt by Hamanaka to recover losses from
According to the CFTC,
previous physical copper dealings.'
Hamanaka "lied to his superiors, destroyed documents, falsified
trading data and forged signatures" in order to hide his losses.24 ' In
fact, Hamanaka employed a secret book whereby he hid the records
of his unauthorized trading.242 In an attempt to redeem his failed
trading, Hamanaka devised a plan allowing him to control the price of
copper and recapture his previous losses.243
The plot began in 1989, when Yasuo Hamanaka met with David
Campbell ("Campbell"), then president of the private metals trading
firm RST Resources, Inc. ("RST"), at a privileged business meeting.2'
At that meeting, Hamanaka allegedly disclosed to Campbell his
intention to "squeeze" the world copper market in an attempt to drive
Subsequently, from 1989 to 1992,
up the price of copper.Hamanaka conducted a significant amount of business with RST,
In 1993,
eventually becoming the company's largest client.2
234. See Fred Vogelstein & Stephen Frank, Sumitomo Says Unauthorized Dealings
In Copper Caused $1.8 Billion in Losses, Wall St. J., June 14, 1996, at A3 [hereinafter
Frank, UnauthorizedDealings].
235. See Vogelstein & Frank, supra note 234, at A3 (describing Hamanaka as
"flamboyant ... who until recently was the world's most powerful copper trader-and
the one most feared by other traders.").
236. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 29.
237. See In re Sumitomo Corp. [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) 27,327, at 46,497 (CFTC May 11,1998).
238. See supra note 3.
239. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) at 46,497.
240. See id.
241. Id. & n.2.
242 See id. at 46,497.
243. See id. Hamanaka admitted under oath, as part of a guilty plea to fraud and
forgery in a Japanese court, that he used complex accounting and trading techniques
to hide his unauthorized trading. See id. at 46,497 n.2.
244. See Stephen E. Frank, 'The Fancy Deal'. Sumitomo's Business Fuels Rapid
Growth of GlobalMinerals, Wall St. J. Eur., June 24, 1996, at 1.
245. See id. Mr. Campbell's attorney denied that Hamanaka and Campbell ever
discussed the proposed "squeeze." See id.; see also supra notes 99-112 and
accompanying text (describing the elements of a long market power manipulation).
246. See Frank, supra note 244.
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however, with $1,000,000 dollars in hand, Campbell resigned from
RST and founded Global Minerals & Metals Corp. ("Global").2 47
Afterwards, Sumitomo ceased doing business with RST and became
Global's largest client.24
The move by Campbell to establish Global allowed Hamanaka to
execute the first of many carefully timed maneuvers. First, Hamanaka
and Campbell entered into a string of intricate agreements whereby
Sumitomo agreed to make monthly purchases of copper from Global
from 1994 to 1997.249 The agreements took form in "a series of supply
contracts that contained unusual minimum price and price
participation provisions."" 0 Ultimately, the goal of these agreements
was to establish the appearance of "legitimate and genuine
commercial need to obtain physical copper."' 1 In order to complete
this plan, Global would purchase copper warrants' 2 from a Zambian
copper producer. 3 Subsequently, Global would sell the copper to
Sumitomo, and finally Sumitomo would complete the circle by selling
the same amount of copper back to the Zambian firm.' As a result
of the paper ("book")2 55 transactions, Hamanaka established a fagade
of legitimate business, thereby providing him with "false commercial

247. See id. Global is a New York-based metal trading firm. See id. A complaint,
filed by the CFTC, alleged that Global manipulated the price of copper between

October and December of 1995. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp. and
Merrill Lynch & Co., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)

27,649, at 48,094-95 (May 20, 1999).
248. See Frank, supra note 244.

249. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 27,327, at 46,497 (CFTC May 11, 1998).
250. Id. The minimum price provision obligated Sumitomo to purchase the copper
from Global at either the settlement price on the LME, or at a minimum price set by
Sumitomo-whichever was higher. See id. In other words, the minimum price
agreements kept cash copper prices at a minimum level set by Sumitomo. In addition,
the price participation provision required Global to pay Sumitomo 30% of the
difference between the market price at the time of shipment and the minimum price
on futures contracts used to "hedge" the supply contracts. See id. These contracts
allowed both parties to benefit from price appreciation of copper. See id.
251. In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249 n.1.
252. A warrant is a "[c]ertificate of physical deposit, which gives title to physical
metal in an exchange approved warehouse." Glossary, supra note 55, at 42.
253. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,093. Hamanaka, through Global and other small
brokers, purchased extensively in the unregulated cash market for copper. See

Suzanne McGee & Stephen E. Frank, CFTC Probes Unusual Loans to Sumitomo,
Wall St. J., July 23, 1996, at A2 [hereinafter McGee & Frank, Unusual Loans]. The
funding to make such large purchases allegedly came from two loans, a $400 million
dollar loan from J.P. Morgan & Co., and a $500 million dollar loan from Chase
Manhattan Corp. See id.
254. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,093.
255. See id.
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justification" ' 6 to establish a large futures position supposedly
hedging the illusory delivery obligations."

The second step in Hamanaka's scheme mandated the
establishment of a massive futures position'2 In order to acquire the
necessary futures contracts on the London Metal Exchange
("LME"), 259 Sumitomo opened an account with Merrill Lynch

("Merrill"), and designated the "B" account, authorizing Global to
trade using Sumitomo's vast line of credit.'
This move provided
Global, a thinly capitalized start-up company, with instant credibility
and the necessary credit to purchase the large number of futures
contracts needed to effectuate Hamanaka's planned course of

action.261
Using the "B" account, Global began to establish a large long
position in LME copper futures.
By September of 1995, Global
acquired an open long futures positionO of 780,000 metric tons of
copper.'
Through the use of other small brokers26 in combination
256. Id. Somewhat ironically, in a 1991 interview, Mr. Hamanaka said, "'Because
we trade so much volume, say, at a peak of several hundreds of thousands tons in
absolute volume, it may look like engaging in speculation.'" See Frank, Unauthorized
Dealings,supra note 234.
257. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,093.
258. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) 1 27,327, at 46,497 (CFTC May 11, 1998).
259. The LME has been characterized as "the center for global metals trading."
McGee & Frank, Metal Detection, infra note 275; see also Reactions to Sumitomo Loss
Proliferateas Copper-Market Volatility Continues, Wall St. J. Eur., June 24, 1996, at
23 (claiming that "90% of copper exchange business is done [on the LME]").
Furthermore, the main page of the LME website states that one of the primary
focuses of the LME is to provide a hedging function to non-ferrous, metal-based
industries. See LME website (visited Feb. 26, 2000) <http'J/wwwv.lme.co.uk/cgibin/mainl.cgi>.
260. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249. According to the CFTC, a Managing Director
at Merrill suggested using this type of account. See id. The account gave Global
"power of attorney over the trading in these 'B' accounts pursuant to documentation
on which [Hamanaka] forged the signatures of his superiors." In re Sumitomo Corp.,
[1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. (CCH), at 46,498. Additionally,
Merrill provided trading advice to Global and Sumitomo on how to acquire both a
dominant cash and futures position. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [19981999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,250.
261. See Frank, supra note 244.
262. See In re GlobalMinerals & Metals Corp. [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249. Presumably, Hamanaka ceased trading on the U.S.
markets, namely the Commodities Exchange, Inc. ("Comex"), a U.S. exchange where
copper futures are actively traded, as a result of the strict disclosure requirements
dictated by the CFTC. See McGee & Frank, Metal Detection, infra note 275. The
LME allegedly had more lax supervision, a perfect setting in which to implement
Hamanaka's plan. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
263. An "open" position is one where the contracts, either purchased or sold, have
not expired and the trader has not entered into offsetting transactions.
264. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249.
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with the "B" account, Sumitomo possessed two million metric tons of
copper in the form of futures and owned nearly one half of LME
copper warrants. 26 At this point, Hamanaka began to unwind 267 the
futures positions by taking delivery on expiring futures contracts to
further his plan to control the cash supply of copper and ultimately
generate large profits. 261 He masked this scheme under the rubric of
legitimate commercial need for physical copper.269 Merrill, through
the "B" account, provided Global with the financing necessary to take
delivery on the LME warrants.7" By November 1995, Sumitomo
controlled virtually 100% of the LME warehouse receipts. 271
Moreover, throughout the fourth quarter of 1995, Sumitomo
maintained a dominant and controlling LME futures position.2z
The structure of Hamanaka's positions placed him in an ideal
position to execute a market power manipulation. 273 He not only
obtained a dominant position in the cash market, but he also
established a powerful long futures position. 274 These positions would
force traders who previously sold copper futures, and who innocently
waited until the end of the delivery period, to run to Hamanaka to
offset their positions at prices that Hamanaka could virtually dictate.

265. Allegedly, Hamanaka conducted some business through Winchester Metals
Ltd., the metal trading division of Winchester Commodities Group Ltd. See Stephen
E. Frank, U.S. Grand Jury to Probe Sumitomo Trader's Moves, Wall St. J., June 18,
1996, at C1. In addition, it was alleged that Hamanaka made purchases through
Rudolff Wolff, another brokerage house in London. See id.
266. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249. A "[wiarrant or Warehouse Receipt for
Metals" is a "[c]ertificate of physical deposit, which gives title to physical metal in an
exchange approved warehouse." Glossary, supra note 55, at 42.
267. Generally, to "unwind" refers to the act of offsetting or taking delivery on a
futures position. See Glossary, supra note 55, at 8 ("Closing-out"); see also supra notes
61-63 (explaining the process of offsetting a position).
268. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249.
269. See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
270. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,249. In total, Merrill financed $500 million to
purchase the warrants. See id. Additionally, Merrill loaned $100 million under a
Commodity Inventory Purchase Obligation ("CIPO") credit line in order "to finance
the acquisition of the premium grade and location copper which was selected through
the purported 'sifting' of the warrants received on delivery and which was to be
shipped to Sumitomo." Id.
271. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 27,327, at 46,498 (CFTC May 11, 1998). Specifically, on November 24, 1995,
Sumitomo, through its account at Merrill, controlled 8098 of 8666 (93%) LME copper
warrants. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 48,250.
272. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH), at 46,498.
273. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text for discussion of market power.
274. See id.
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The LME's decision, in late 1994, to open a warehouse in Long
Beach, California, would ultimately impact U.S. markets and would
also prove to be devastating to Hamanaka's scheme.275 The
warehouse allowed LME clients to store copper, and it gave North
American customers easy access to the metal. 6 The opening of the
warehouse by the LME prompted an "angry response from Daniel
Rappaport, the feisty chairman of the New York Mercantile
Exchange,"' which initially sounded like childish jealousy.a During
the fall of 1995, however, copper prices began to rise and cash supplies
began to tighten.? 9 The constricted cash market resulted from copper
continuously flowing into LME warehouses, while none ever seemed
to leave. This effect was a natural consequence of Hamanaka's and
Global's actions.2 Consequently, cash copper began to exceed the
prices for copper futures. 281 This inversion of futures prices to cash
prices, referred to as "backwardation" by market participants, may
signal that someone is trying to control the supply of a commodityY
Importantly, because there is a direct correlation between copper
prices on the LME and those on the Commodity Exchange, Inc.
("Comex"), prices in the United States were affected.' LME futures
began to trade at a premium over Comex futures.' The higher LME
futures prices in turn caused copper supplies to move from Comex
warehouses into the LME's Long Beach warehouse.? The significant

275. See Suzanne McGee & Stephen E. Frank, Metal Detection: Sumitomo Debacle
is Tied to Lax Controls by Firm, Regulators, Wall St. J., June 17, 1996, at Al
[hereinafter McGee & Frank, Metal Detection].

276. See id.

277. Id
278. See id Mr. Rappaport believed that the LME's Long Beach warehouse was

an attempt to eradicate the copper business of the Comex division of the New York

Mercantile Exchange. See Suzanne McGee & Stephen E. Frank, Warehouse Effect:
Sumitomo's Losses Add Fuel to Debate on Lax Supervision, Wall St. J. Eur., June 17,
1996, at 1 [hereinafter McGee & Frank, Warehouse Effect].
279. See McGee & Frank, Metal Detection, supra note 275.
280. See id
281. See Brian P. Volkman, Defining The Role of Commodities Regulators, 19
N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 215,219 (1999).
282. See id at 219-20. The opposite of backwardation is "contango," which is a
"[m]arket situation in which prices in succeeding delivery months are progressively
higher than in the nearest delivery month." Glossary, supra note 55, at 10. The reason
for contango is that a futures position generally reflects the cost of holding the
commodity. See Satyajit Das, Swaps and Financial Derivatives 505 (2d ed. 1994).
Incorporated in holding costs are interest expenses incurred in funding the holding of
a cash commodity. See id In addition, there are storage costs and the possibility of
"the physical loss of the commodity through wastage and deterioration of the
quality." Id (emphasis in original).
283. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.
(CCH) 27,327, at 46,498 (CFTC May 11, 1998).
284. See id at 46,498-99.
285. See id
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movement of copper supplies to the LME warehouse, in late fall 1995,
finally moved the CFTC to start an investigation.2 6
Problematically, however, the CFTC could not initially identify the
controlling party due to a slow response and denial by the LME of any
market irregularities.' Unbeknownst to international regulators, the
large build-up of LME copper was in fact the result of the significant
purchases of LME copper warrants by Hamanaka and Global. 2ss
Hamanaka continued to take control of the LME copper warrants and
maintained dominant futures positions well into the spring of 1996.289
At one point, copper prices reached an outstanding $2,800 per metric
ton due to the manipulator's activities. 2g Finally, however, in April
1996, after numerous complaints and letters by the CFTC to the LME,
British regulators and the Sumitomo Corporation finally agreed to
cooperate in the Commission's investigation.291
The investigation that ensued opened up a can of worms that no
one foresaw. During the investigation, a clerk at Sumitomo
discovered the unauthorized accounts at Merrill and several other
small brokerage houses, and subsequently reported them to his
superiors. 292 Sumitomo quickly removed Hamanaka from his post as
head copper trader on May 9, 1996.293 Hamanaka's removal occurred,
however, before he could fully unwind his futures and cash positions
at the high price that he had orchestrated.2 9 In the months that
followed his removal, Sumitomo began to sell off the positions
295
amassed by Hamanaka, thereby causing copper prices to plummet.
On June 5, 1996, before investigators had full opportunity to uncover
Hamanaka's grand scheme, Hamanaka called one of his superiors and
297
confessed.296 Yasuo Hamanaka's great copper caper had ended!
286. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 28.
287. See McGee & Frank, Metal Detection, supra note 275.

In fact, the LME

historically has a reputation for lax supervision. One observer went so far as to "blast
the [LME's] lackluster efforts at surveillance and enforcement as well as its lax
disclosure requirements and criticize rules they say could allow rogue traders to
flourish." Id. (emphasis added).
288. See In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder]

Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)

27,686, at 48,249 (CFTC May 20, 1999).

289. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 46,498.

290. See id.
291. See McGee & Frank, Metal Detection, supra note 275.

292. See McGee & Frank, Warehouse Effect, supra note 278.
293. See id.
294. See Vogelstein & Frank, supra note 234.
295. See, e.g., supra note 233 ("The benchmark three-month copper futures on the
London Metal Exchange plunged to a 2 1/2-year low of $1,785 a ton...."). The

$1,785 price, cited on June 25, 1996, is more than $1000 a ton less than the price of
$2,800 reached in May 1996. See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder]

Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 46,498.
296. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 28.
297. Ultimately, Hamanaka left Sumitomo with $2.6 billion in losses and an
additional $200 million necessary to settle multiple lawsuits. See supra notes 5-6 and

2000]COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET MANIPULATION 277
Ultimately, the CFTC found that as a result of Hamanaka's activity,
Sumitomo Corporation intentionally caused artificial prices in the
copper markets. 298
The most glaring aspects of the Sumitomo scandal are that it not
only required a great deal of intricacy, but that it also demanded
incredible levels of time and capital. Hamanaka, through Global,
borrowed in excess of $600 million from Merrill Lynch alone.'
Moreover, the plan took Hamanaka almost eight years to implement
fully.3 °
Consequently, if future manipulative schemes require
anywhere near the level of complexity of the Sumitomo scandal, then
manipulation is arguably not the rampant problem that regulators
believe. Furthermore, the current U.S. regulatory structure is
arguably sufficient to prevent rogue traders like Hamanaka from
effectuating harmful manipulative schemes.
III. A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION FOR PREVENTING MARKET POWER
MANIPULATIONS

Although some commentators believe that increased regulation is
necessary to prevent another Sumitomo-like situation,"' the current
system is arguably adequate to preclude a trader from obtaining
market power because the disclosure requirements are rigorous and
hinder attempted acquisitions of market dominance. In order to
prevent the risk that large traders will speculate, however, more
stringent monitoring of the hedging exemption is necessary to
determine when hedgers truly have a legitimate commercial purpose.
Furthermore, because Hamanaka took refuge on foreign exchanges, it
is extremely important that international regulators continue their
effort towards establishing a functional and collaborative system to
share information. 3 2 When the CFTC observed abnormal supplies of
copper flowing from Comex warehouses into LME warehouses,
followed by outrageous price increases on U.S. exchanges, the CFTC
and British regulators should have been working side-by-side to
uncover the root cause of these irregularities.
This kind of
collaboration could potentially have stopped Hamanaka's
manipulation much earlier.
accompanying text.
29& See In re Sumitomo Corp., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep.

(CCi-) at 46,499-46,500.
299. See supra note 270 (detailing Hamanaka's borrowing from Merill Lynch). To
date, Hamanaka's other borrowings have not been made public.
300. See text accompanying supra notes 244-46 (describing how Hamanaka began
the initial stages of his plan as early as 1989). The actual price rises did not occur until
the fall of 1995, and they continued until the spring of 1996. See text accompanying
supra note 289-90.
301. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
302. See infra Part II.C.3. (discussing the Tokyo Commodity Futures Markets
Regulators' Conference).
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This part begins by exploring the regulatory structure set out in the
CEA, and explaining how the current system prevents the acquisition
of market power by individuals whose sole objective is to adversely
affect prices. It then proposes that in order to prevent the risk of
speculation by large market participants who use the hedging
exemption by claiming that they have legitimate business needs, it is
essential that the CFTC more carefully monitor those falling under
the exemption. Finally, this part outlines the proposed cooperative
measures of the Tokyo Commodity Market Regulators' Futures
Conference, an international regulatory discussion that confronted the
issue of manipulation. It concludes that the combination of the
current regulatory scheme, tougher monitoring of the hedging
exemption, and continuing cooperative efforts by international
regulators will protect prices on U.S. markets and stifle the efforts of
traders, such as Hamanaka, who attempt to move prices by acquiring
market power.
A. CurrentRegulatory Structure
At present, the CEA explicitly places position limits on excessive
speculation. °3
While recognizing the invaluable function of
speculators to the hedging process, Congress also sought to curtail
detrimental speculation.3° Ironically, however, according to the
CFTC, the bulk of market power manipulation cases have been
brought against parties making use of the hedging exemption.3 5
The regulations provide a system whereby the secrecy required to
obtain market power is virtually eliminated, even for traders who
qualify for the hedging exemption. For example, 17 C.F.R. § 15.01
(d)(1) provides that those persons3" holding positions in excess of the
position limits of 17 C.F.R. § 150.2, "any part of which constitutes
bona fide hedging positions" within the terms of 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) of
the regulations, are required to report their positions to the CFTC.3°7
Although 17 C.F.R. § 150.2 only includes certain commodities, 30 8 the
CFTC could add additional commodities to the list, such as copper, in
order to increase protection in markets susceptible to manipulative
303. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.

304. See supra notes 21-30, 70-79 and accompanying text (discussing the excessive
speculation prohibitions under the CEA).

305. See Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at 370; see also Snider,
supra note 22, § 12.05, at 12-9, 12-10 n.34 ("It is ironic to note that many

manipulations are conducted by hedgers who, because of their extensive commercial
activity, are in an advantageous position based on their access to market information
and ability to handle the cash commodity.")
306. See supra note 8 (defining the word "person" as used in the CEA).

307. 17 C.F.R. § 15.01(d)(1) (1999).
308. The commodities listed under 17 C.F.R. § 150.2 are: corn, oats, soybeans,
wheat, soybean oil, soybean meal, hard red spring wheat, white wheat, oats, cotton

no.2, and hard winter wheat.

2000]COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET MANIPULATION 279
activity. Determining which commodities are to be added to the list of
17 C.F.R. § 150.2 could be based on the susceptibility of a particular
commodity to acquisitions of market power of both the futures and
cash markets.
Furthermore, despite the fact that 17 C.F.R. § 150.3- permits some
persons to exceed the limits of 17 C.F.R. § 150.2 if they have a bona
fide hedging position,3 10 17 C.F.R. § 15.01(d)(1) deters traders from
attempting to hide speculative transactions under the mask of a bona
fide hedge.3 11 The regulations outline the elements a person must
include in a report and those seeking to abuse the hedging exemption
31 2
will likely be unveiled when compelled to report their positions.
Importantly, the quantity of physical stocks that a person owns as well
as the "quantity of a fixed price sale commitment" that a person seeks
to hedge are at least two items that must be included in a
Commission-mandated report. These reporting requirements would,
therefore, require companies like Sumitomo to expose large futures
and cash positions which are truly speculative in nature, but which the
company submits are bona fide hedging transactions. If the CFTC, for
example, observed the establishment of an immense copper position
on a U.S. exchange, the position would send a red flag to the CFTC
that the commodity in question was an area that required further
investigation. The investigation would subsequently lead them to
Sumitomo, a risk that Hamanaka did not want to face.
In addition to reporting requirements for persons, the regulations
require that organized exchanges set position limits for the parties
that trade on the exchange. 313 Exchange-established limits provide an
added level of protection against manipulative activity.
The
exchange-set position limits make it even more difficult to amass the
requisite level of futures contracts needed to exercise market power.
Finally, § 4g(a) of the CEA requires any person registered with the
CFTC as a "futures commission merchant [("FCM")],314 introducing
broker,3 15 floor broker,316 or floor trader '317 to keep reports of their
309. The exemption, however, is not granted without qualification. See id § 150.3.
Section 150.3 permits the CFTC to "call for information" if a person claims an
exemption from the speculative limits. Id § 150.3 (ii)(b).
310. See id.
311. See id § 15.01 (d)(1).
312. See id. § 19.01.
313. See id § 150.2. Interestingly, a Wall Street Journal article published soon after
the Sumitomo debacle was uncovered claimed that it would be easier to prosecute
Sumitomo for violating position limits than manipulation. See McGee & Frank, Hard
to Prove, supra note 40.
314. Futures commission merchants ("FCM") are defined as "[i]ndividuals,
associations, partnerships, corporations and trusts that solicit or accept orders for the
purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any
contract market and that accept payment from or extend credit to those whose orders
are accepted." Glossary, supra note 55, at 19 (emphasis added).
315. An introducing broker ("IB") is:
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activity and to "keep such books and records open to... the
Commission.""31 An FCM must maintain records in a manner in
which trades by customers are capable of being matched with the
trades that are reported in an exchange's daily reports.319 For
example, the regulations require contract markets (e.g. NYMEX) to
give detailed daily reports to the CFTC, including the open interest in
a contract for that day and the number of contracts purchased and
sold.320 Furthermore, the section of the regulations entitled "Special
Calls" authorizes the Commission, at its request, to discover all
information pertaining to accounts held by an FCM.32 1 Specifically,
the Commission, under 17 C.F.R. § 21.02, can demand the names of
traders and the positions they hold through the FCM. 31 As a result,
the CFTC can uncover a large position that a company like Sumitomo
is attempting to conceal using its FCM (e.g. Global).3 '
The stringent regulatory structure under the CEA is precisely one
of the reasons that Hamanaka ceased trading activity on U.S.
exchanges." If Hamanaka sought to trade on U.S. exchanges, the
regulatory agencies would monitor his every move and could at any
time inquire into suspect trading activity by obtaining position reports
from Sumitomo, Global, and the exchanges. The combination of
reporting and disclosure requirements creates such a risk of being
exposed that even rogue traders, who do not care whether they trade
legally or illegally,3" would not attempt manipulative schemes because
the chances of success are slim to none. Hamanaka's scandal
flourished, however, because he was capable of establishing large
speculative positions using the title of "hedger" and veiling his
[a]ny person (other than a person registered as an "associated person" of a
futures commission merchant) who is engaged in soliciting or in accepting
orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on an

exchange who does not accept any money, securities, or property to margin,
guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result therefrom.
Id. at 23.

316. A floor broker is "[a]ny person who, in any pit, ring, post or other place
provided by a contract market for the meeting of persons similarly engaged, executes

for another person any orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future
delivery." Id. at 18.
317. A floor trader is "[a]n exchange member who executes his own trades by

being personally present in the pit for futures trading." Id.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Commodity Exchange Act § 4g(a), 7 U.S.C. § 6g (1994).
See 17 C.F.R. § 17.00 (1999).
See id. § 16.00.
Id. § 21.00.
Id. § 21.02.
Although neither Global nor any of its members were ever registered with the

CFTC in any capacity, see In re Global Minerals & Metals Corp. [1998-1999 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.

27,649, at 48,090-91 (CFTC May 20, 1999), they would

be required to register if they executed trades on U.S. exchanges. See Commodity
Exchange Act § 4d, 7 U.S.C. § 6d.
324. See supra note 262.
325. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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positions using Global as his FCM. Consequently, this Note
encourages further oversight of the hedging exemption and increased
steps by international regulators to share information and cooperate
with investigations.
B. IncreasedMonitoring of the Hedging Exemption
One additional measure that could be adopted to prevent scandals
resembling Sumitomo would be more careful monitoring of those who
fall within the hedging exemption of § 4a(c) of the CEA.
Greater
monitoring would prevent a player who conducts large amounts of
legitimate business on organized exchanges, such as Sumitomo, from
parading as a speculator using a hedger's cloak. Although a trader
may be required to report a hedged cash position, arguably the
combination of surveillance and disclosure requirements would more
effectively prevent rogue traders such as Yasuo Hamanaka from
establishing illegitimate positions that merely seek to raise prices and
extract unlawful profits.
Under the current system, the CFTC could discover a rogue trader's
intentions because it would observe the amassing of an abnormally
large position and could subsequently make a "special call" r
inquiring into its necessity. The ability to manipulate is dependent on
secrecym and the hedging exemption indirectly allows for large
positions that have the potential to be harmful. Because most
manipulation cases involve customers who fall under the hedging
exemption,329 the CFTC must more carefully screen large traders who
purport to have a bona fide hedge. By permitting the establishment of
large or dominant positions, the CFTC runs the risk that the asserted
hedge will actually be used for illegal speculation, which is precisely
what regulators witnessed in the Sumitomo debacle. Hamanaka
attempted to trade on U.S. exchanges and had the CFTC rigorously
monitored his proclaimed hedges, the Sumitomo debacle would most
likely have been avoided.

326. See Conference Report on the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, in
Johnson & Hazen, 2D, supra note 4, at 128-30 (Supp. 1996). Additional regulation,

however, may not be seen for several years. William Rainer, the new chairman of the

CFTC, is less of a regulator than his predecessor Brooksley Born. See Cheryl Strauss
Einhorn, Going, Going... The CFTC's New Head Wants to Blast Heavy-Handed

Regulation Out of the Park, Barron's, Nov. 8, 1999, at 30. Rainer claimed that
although he has more of an anti-regulation viewpoint with regard to cash-settled
contracts, he is more cautious with regard to physical commodities. See id.
327. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.

328. See supra text accompanying note 287 (discussing the fact that the CFTC

could not discover who held the large futures positions on the LME).
329. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

C. IncreasedInternationalRegulatory Cooperation
If trading occurred only on U.S. exchanges, the CEA and

accompanying regulations would arguably be sufficient to prevent
large-scale manipulative schemes such as the one in Sumitomo.
Because economics have become global, however, and as a result, a
manipulator's actions can have worldwide effects, market regulators
should cooperate on a more international level.33 °
Following the Sumitomo disaster in the fall of 1995 and spring of
1996, regulators recognized the importance of cooperation.3"' On
October 31, 1997, seventeen commodity market regulators from
sixteen countries met at the Tokyo Commodity Futures Markets
Regulators' Conference to discuss proposed regulatory oversight of
the world's commodity futures markets.33 2 The two most relevant
topics of the conference for dealing with market power manipulations

were market surveillance and information sharing. 333 The regulatory
authorities at the conference endorsed standards for best practice,
which they set out explicitly in the Guidance on Components of
With regard to
Market Surveillance and Information Sharing.3'
market surveillance, the attendees of the conference agreed that they
needed more routine collection of information about futures and cash
market positions.3 In addition, they agreed to "cooperate to share
information, in particular information on large exposures. "336
Moreover, with respect to surveillance, the regulators concurred that
they needed to establish better practices "to detect and to prevent
abusive conduct.

'337

Additionally, the conference participants agreed

330. Section 12 authorizes the CFTC to cooperate with any foreign authority. See
Commodity Exchange Act § 12(a). In addition, Title III of the Futures Trading
Practice Act of 1992, "Assistance to Foreign Futures Authorities," provides increased
authority for the CFTC to interact on a more international level. See Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992 §§ 301-05, Pub. L. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992).
331. See Volkman, supra note 281, at 240.
332. See Tokyo Commodity Futures Markets Regulators' Conference 3
[hereinafter Tokyo Conference]. The represented authorities were: Australian
Securities Commission (Australia), Comissao de Valores Mobiliirios (Brazil),
Canadian Grain Commission (Canada), Commission des Opdrations de Bourse
(France), Bundesaufsichtsamt ffir den Wertpapierhandel (Germany), Securities and
Futures Commission (Hong Kong), Hungarian Banking and Capital Market
Supervision (Hungary), Commissione Nazionale per le SocietA e la Borsa (Italy),
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (Japan), Ministry of Finance and Economy (Korea), Securities Commission
(Malaysia), Securities Board of the Netherlands (Netherlands), Singapore Trade
Development Board (Singapore), Financial Services Board (South Africa), Financial
Services Authority (United Kingdom), Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(United States). See id. at 11.
333. See id. at 7.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 34.
336. Id. at 7.
337. Id. at 35.
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that "[m]arket authorities should have access to information that
permits them to identify concentrations of positions and the
composition of the market."3"
Sumitomo was clear evidence of the fact that the LME had less
stringent supervisory requirements than those of U.S. exchanges. 39
For example, in 1996, the CFTC required disclosure of large positions,
whereas the LME merely made it voluntary for brokers to report their
As articulated by the chairman of the Chicago
large positions.'
Board of Trade, large position reports arguably stifle the amount of
On the
business that large traders will conduct on an exchange.'
other hand, the chairman of the NYMEX recognized that without the
rigorous reporting requirements set by the CFTC, Hamanaka may
have executed his attempt at manipulation directly on the U.S.
exchange. 2
Finally, the conference participants recommended that further work
be undertaken to ensure effective information sharing among market
regulators. 3 The conference report stated that regulators need to
share "relevant information concerning the supervision of their
respective markets, both on a routine basis and as needed, and to
Moreover,
promote communication among relevant personnel."'
the participants agreed that they should "support [ ] efforts to
categorise and to prioritise the information which market authorities
may wish to share during specific market events, such as the
possibility of market manipulations."' 5 The agreement to share
information is vital in preventing further Sumitomo scandals. During
the fall of 1995, when the CFTC noticed the backwardation6 in the
copper market, the LME was reluctant to share information.'
Subsequent to Sumitomo, however, the CFTC and British regulators
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they consented to
cooperate with one another and to share supervisory information. In sum, the Tokyo Conference "encourages a parity of market
surveillance and information sharing among the jurisdictions of its
seventeen [sic] endorsing countries."- 9 If implemented, the solutions
proposed at the conference will make it much more difficult for rogue
traders like Yasuo Hamanaka to effectuate manipulative schemes.
33& Id at 7.
339. See supra Part IM.A. (describing the strict regulatory scheme on United States
futures markets as mandated by the CFrC).
340. See Volkman, supra note 281, at 237.

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

See id at 238.
See id
See Tokyo Conference, supra note 332, at 35.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 36.

346. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (describing backwardation).

347. See Volkman, supra note 281, at 239.
34& See id at 239-40.
349. Id at 240.
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Problematically, the proposed cooperative measures will only work if
the countries that endorsed the conference participants allow the
regulators to establish effective systems for market surveillance and
information sharing."' The combination of current domestic and
proposed international measures, nevertheless, are the right steps
toward preventing a severe manipulation problem, and these
measures provide the CFTC with multiple, simpler and quicker
methods of prosecution. 1
CONCLUSION

The purpose of prohibiting the concept of manipulation, regardless
of how one defines the term, is to avoid price movements that would
not otherwise exist and which ultimately cause damage to other
market participants.
The CFTC is primarily concerned with
protecting the integrity of U.S. markets. Hamanaka's trading activity
in both the cash market for copper and in futures contracts on the
LME caused radical price movements on U.S. exchanges. These price
abnormalities were largely the result of three things. First, Hamanaka
did not face the strict regulations that the CFTC imposes on U.S.
exchanges. Second, Hamanaka was capable of speculating while
claiming a position as a hedger because of the tremendous amounts of
copper business conducted by the Sumitomo Corporation. Finally,
the LME's failure to cooperate immediately with the CFTC when it
alleged that there was a problem on the U.S. markets allowed
Hamanaka to push prices to exorbitant levels.
One could argue that Sumitomo demonstrates the need to revamp
the entire system to prevent a scandal in the physical commodity
futures markets. Yasuo Hamanaka did, in fact, capture almost 93% of
the physical supply of copper in addition to a dominant futures
position on the LME, thereby causing prices to rise to extravagant
levels.
Very few players in the futures markets, however, have
enough time, capital, or creativity to implement a long market power
53
manipulation of a physical commodity with any degree of success.
Moreover, if the current regulatory structure is combined with more
careful monitoring of those who fall under the hedging exemption,
and increased cooperation among international regulatory authorities
becomes a reality, futures markets are more likely to avoid
detrimental situations like those witnessed in the Sumitomo scandal.
Ultimately, in the futures market for physical commodities, if the
LME had cooperated with the CFTC's investigation, the effect of
350. See id.
351. See, e.g., Markham, Unprosecutable Crime, supra note 25, at 357 & n.505
(discussing the extensive time periods that typically are required to litigate charges of
manipulation).
352. See supra notes 262-74 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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Hamanaka's actions on world copper markets would not have been so
disastrous.

Notes & Observations

